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1In August 1975, the Woonsocket Teachers’ Guild News posed the question, “Why must 
public employees always have to be the ones to take it on the chin?”1  When my father, the 
union’s vice-president, penned these words he was referring to a dispute between his union and 
the city’s school committee.  The five hundred local teachers faced an imminent strike after 
negotiations with the school committee reached an impasse.  In this small Rhode Island 
community, it was evident that government workers were treated differently than their private 
sector counterparts in regard to their legal rights to take action against their employers.  
However, this tension was not confined solely within this one school district.  Rather, the 
question regarding the treatment of public sector workers touched on a deeply rooted division 
between public and private sector workers which has troubled the American labor movement.  
With public sector workers growing ever more central to the labor movement in the last quarter 
century, their unusual status and history have become particularly critical.   
Labor in the United States has been commonly associated with images of industrialism, 
factories, and skilled craftsmen.  However, this narrow vision of labor ignores the millions of 
Americans employed by the federal, state, and local governments.  Both private and public sector 
employees struggled against their employers, the legal system, and the community for the legal 
rights to organize and employ labor’s greatest weapon, the strike.  Though private and public 
sector labor engaged in similar battles, they traveled on two divergent paths with very different 
timetables.  Since the 1930s private sector labor has been granted legal protections making the 
distinction between private and public sector labor unions apparent.  The question of why public 
1
 “The Union Bulletin’s Hard Line,” The Woonsocket Call, 7 August 1975, p. 8.  
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2sector labor law developed differently from that of the private sector is an interesting and largely 
forgotten topic, but one that spurred my curiosity and led to this project.    
The first challenges by private sector workers against their employers and the legal 
system appeared in the early nineteenth century.  The earliest organized labor strikes prompted 
charges of conspiracy from the legal community.  In 1842, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court set a remarkable precedent and allowed workers to unionize.  However, the conspiracy
theory did not disappear.  From 1890 to 1932, private sector unions fell under the scrutiny of the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act which when applied by the courts to labor unions labeled them an 
illegal “conspiracy in restraint of trade.”  The heyday of private sector activism occurred in the 
early 1930s as massive strikes were launched across the nation.  The turning point in the struggle 
of private sector labor transpired during the New Deal when Congress took the debate over labor 
unions out of the court system.  By 1940, the Supreme Court had affirmed the right of unions to 
strike.  The key pieces of New Deal legislation and judicial support gave private sector unions 
the legitimacy needed to become crucial players in the American economy.    
In the 1960s and 1970s, when social and economic conditions motivated an increase in 
public sector activity, government workers would not fare as well.  Their attempts to unionize 
and strike were denied legitimacy on two grounds.  First, in the absence of the profit motive and 
an exploitive employer, unions were seen as unnecessary in the public sector.  Second, the 
concept of governmental sovereignty played a key role in the opposition.  Sovereignty, a 
carryover of English common law, provides the government with complete independence and 
power.  Unionization and strikes by workers threatened the state’s control over its employees,
which led many officials to withhold their support from public sector workers.  For example, 
President Franklin Roosevelt was a liberal politician, a great crusader for the rights of American 
3laborers, and signed key pieces of New Deal legislation strengthening the rights of the private 
sector worker.  However, in 1937, Roosevelt stated, “a strike of public employees manifests 
nothing less than an attempt on their part to prevent or obstruct the operations of government 
until their demands are satisfied. Such action, looking toward the paralysis of government by 
those who have sworn to support it, is unthinkable and intolerable.”2 Due to this opposition by 
government officials and the community, public sector employees’ rights developed 
independently of their private sector counterparts.  The rights to unionize and strike were never 
included, nor prohibited, in any of the federal laws passed during the New Deal.  Their exclusion 
goes down as one of the great historical ironies for the most union friendly period in U.S. history 
completely resisted public-sector militance.  Instead separate legislation developed, but this at 
first only governed federal employees.  State and local government workers were left in the 
hands of judge-made law and state ordinances.  These judicial decisions and legislation would 
deny public sector unions the basic rights afforded to their private sector counterparts, including 
the right to strike.  
In the absence of a national law to define the rights of all public sector labor unions, the 
battles fought by government workers must be examined at the state and local level.  The first 
states to tackle the public sector labor question “tended to be strong two party states with active 
and powerful organized labor.”3 Rhode Island fit this definition perfectly.  The history of Rhode 
Island and the labor movement are integrally linked.  Local labor historian Paul Buhle concluded 
that organized labor lies at the heart of a Rhode Islander’s identity for “every worker in a state as 
compact and labor-conscious as Rhode Island has felt the impact of labor’s tradition- if not in his 
2
 Letter to Luther C. Steward, August 16, 1937, quoted in Sterling D. Spero, Government as Employer (New York: Remsen 
Press, 1948), 2.
3
 Richard Kearney, Labor Relations in the Public Sector (New York:  Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1984), 65.
4or her own life, then in the lives of family and friends.”4  As a native Rhode Islander, organized 
labor has played an important role in the life of my family.  My parents have been active 
members and officers in the Woonsocket Teachers’ Guild, a local of the American Federation of 
Teachers, AFL-CIO, all of their adult lives.  This deeply rooted relationship between the state of 
Rhode Island, its citizens, and organized labor has allowed the state to serve as a haven for 
organized labor when most of the nation fought vehemently against it.  The long history and 
tradition of organized labor in Rhode Island provides the perfect environment in which to 
examine the struggles of public sector unions against the courts, legislature, and public opinion, 
to obtain the rights to organize and strike.   
Teachers’ labor unions, as one of the more active professional organizations in the public 
sector, provide the best example of the long and arduous battle public labor unions would have to 
fight in order to gain recognition and certain rights.  In Rhode Island, teachers’ organizations
were among the first groups to actively take a stance against their public employers.  Prior to the 
1950s, teachers’ unions were relatively docile groups taking little action against their employers.  
Unlike many of their New England neighbors, Rhode Island teachers have used the strike 
steadily since the 1950s as a tool for change.  In 2001, a journalist noted that a teachers’ strike is 
so “incredibly common in Rhode Island that residents forget how rare it is across the United 
States. Just next door, in Connecticut, entire generations of children have never seen their 
teachers on the picket line.”5
While Rhode Island quickly embraced private sector organized labor and supported 
workers’ rights, the enthusiasm did not readily transfer to public sector workers when they began 
to struggle for the same rights.  Across the country, the first pieces of public sector legislation 
4
 Paul Buhle, ed., Working Lives: An Oral History of Rhode Island Labor (Providence: Rhode Island Historical Society, 1987), 6.
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5and laws passed were an attempt to abolish strikes.  Rhode Island became one of the first states 
to legally and formally limit the rights of public sector workers.  Due to the fact that teachers 
were among the most militant state workers, early developments in Rhode Island public sector 
labor law dealt primarily with the issue of teachers’ strikes.
In the last fifty years, public sector labor law has been probed many times by a variety of 
scholars.  However, most of the published studies examine the development of public sector 
labor law at the national level.  Sterling Spero’s Government as Employer, published in 1948, 
became the first comprehensive survey of public sector labor law.  However at the time he wrote 
his work, only federal workers had taken action against their employers.  The scope of this work 
did not extend to the law governing state and local workers.  Similarly, Kurt Hanslowe’s The 
Emerging Law of Labor Relations in Public Employment was also published too long ago, in 
1967, to cover the bulk of the public sector labor battle.  Richard Kearney’s Labor Relations in 
the Public Sector, from 1984, does a wonderful survey of developments across the nation, but 
does not focus on any particular state and, therefore, misses the truly local influences which 
shaped the rights of government workers.  Finally David Colton and Edith Graber’s Teachers 
Strikes and the Courts paints a complete picture of the evolution of teachers’ strikes, but again is 
limited to the national trends and fails to pay attention to the local aspect of public sector labor 
law.  This study instead examines the truly local nature of public sector labor law by focusing 
primarily on legal developments in Rhode Island.  At the same time, however, I will attempt to 
show Rhode Island’s place in the larger scope of the labor movement by continually reflecting 
how national developments paralleled local changes.
This work will trace the development of public sector labor in Rhode Island from its early 
beginnings in the 1950s until the present day.  Chapter 1 will briefly explore Rhode Island’s long 
6tradition of supporting organized labor and the rights guaranteed to union members by state 
courts and national legislation.  An examination of this strong tradition is crucial for it will serve 
as a point of comparison for the struggle of Rhode Island public sector employees.  Chapter 2
focuses on the development of national federal legislation, state legislation and case law 
governing public sector unions, from its initial appearance in the early 1950s until public sector 
activism climaxed in the mid-1970s.  Chapter 3 provides a detailed examination of the 
development, the issues, the participants, and the eventual resolution of a teachers’ strike 
conducted by the Woonsocket Teachers’ Guild during the highpoint of teacher activism in 1975.  
Chapter 4 will examine the status of public labor today, recent legislation and case law, and 
labor’s prospects for the future.  
In the last decade a paradox has emerged within the state.  Even though labor remains a 
powerful force in Rhode Island, the treatment of labor by the courts has radically shifted in the 
last ten years.  Nationwide there has been a slight decrease in public sector union membership in 
the last decade.  However, Rhode Island has remained immune from this phenomenon.  Instead, 
public sector unionism has actually risen in the last ten years providing Rhode Island with the 
second highest percentage of public sector unionism in the country.  This trend would seem to 
suggest that Rhode Island has remained a hospitable environment for labor.  However, at the 
same time, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island has withdrawn much of its support from labor 
and begun issuing rulings in favor of management.  According to research conducted by the 
state’s largest public sector union the Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, the 
Supreme Court has ruled in favor of management in twenty of twenty-three cases brought before 
the bench in the last decade.6  New legal interpretations by recently appointed judges, the
growing power of corporations, and the declining power of the Democratic Party in the state are 
6
 Steven Stycos, “Shifting Tides,” The Providence Phoenix, 8- 14 November 2002.
7seen as partially responsible.  At the moment, Rhode Island has not lost the distinction of being 
one of the most labor friendly states in the nation; however these recent judicial rulings suggest a 
significant change might be just around the corner.
8CHAPTER 1: 
A Brief History of Organized Labor: The Rise & Fall of Rhode Island Private Sector Unions
In October 1891, Samuel Gompers proclaimed, “wherever people enjoy most liberty, 
trade unions are most formidable.”7  In this one brief statement, Gompers captured the essence of 
the American labor movement for, in a country founded upon the notion of freedom, logic 
dictates that industrialized workers come together to seek added rights which would ensure their 
liberty.  During the nineteenth century, the growing disparity in power between individual 
workers and their employers began an increasing movement towards unionization by labor in an 
attempt to protect itself against the abuses of big business.  As a result, the development of the 
labor movement and the legislation governing its operation comprise one of the most complex 
and troubled relationships in American history.  
While national labor legislation in the twentieth century would set the trend in private 
sector labor across the country, the true character of labor is best observed at the state level.  
Organized labor and the history of Rhode Island are so intertwined that to neglect the 
development of the state’s labor movement would leave gaping holes in the history of American 
labor.  Rhode Island labor history is unusual for no where else in this country could one find a 
state so deeply saturated with the struggle for rights by organized labor.  Since the state’s 
founding in 1636 as a heretic colony, Rhode Island has represented an oddity among the 
traditional Puritan colonies of New England.  The “independent, otherwise minded character”8 of 
the state asserted itself foremost in the labor arena as Rhode Island became home to the first 
textile mill and the first textile strike. 
7
 Samuel Gompers, “Trade-Unions: Their Achievements, Methods, and Aims,” The Journal of Social Science, 28 (October 
1891), 400.
8
 George H. Keller and J. Stanley Lemons, Rhode Island (Woodland Hills, Calif.: Windsor Publications, Inc., 1982), 33.
9I.  Laying the Groundwork:  Industrialization in Rhode Island
The colony of Rhode Island began as seaport where ocean borne commerce was the key 
to the economic success of the colony.  By the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, the 
state turned away from the ocean and began a rapid period of industrialization.  
For Rhode Island historians, “the fundamental question is…why did the state become the 
most industrialized state in the nation?”9  The territory had very few deposits of iron, coal, and 
other materials associated with manufacturing.  Rhode Island, as the smallest state, had limited 
land that hindered market and population growth.  In addition, the transportation systems which 
existed in the early nineteenth century gave the state access to only Worcester, New York, and 
Boston.  The varied weather of the state, from summertime droughts to frozen rivers in the 
winter, was not ideal for water-powered factories.  However, the declining ocean trade led the 
state to develop textile, metal, and jewelry industries.  
Industrialization began with Samuel Slater, who, in December 1780, arrived in Rhode 
Island with the plans for British embargoed textile machinery memorized.  Slater was hired by 
Almy & Brown to build a factory in Pawtucket.  On December 20, 1780, Slater’s mill began 
producing cotton yarn, and thus, “Rhode Island had given birth to cotton manufacturing in 
America.”10  The textile industry did not remain solely in Pawtucket.  By 1809, twenty-five 
textile mills had been built in nine different towns.  Six years later, there were one hundred mills 
scattered over twenty-one towns.  By the Civil War, the textile industry in Rhode Island was 
valued at twenty million dollars, a large sum at that time, and employed 15,739 people.11
Metal and jewelry were also key to Rhode Island’s industrial success.  The metal industry 
developed at a slower rate than textiles.  Before the dawn of the Civil War, over one hundred 
9 Ibid., 63.
10 Ibid., 57.
11 Ibid.
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metal working factories appeared.  In addition, the tiny state was home to four of the “Five 
Industrial Wonders of the World,” which included the largest tool, file, steam engine, screw, and 
silverware factories in the nation.12  The growth of the Rhode Island jewelry industry, based in 
Providence, outpaced that of major cities such as New York and Philadelphia, making 
Providence the nation’s jewelry capital.  As a result of this industrial growth, skilled labor 
became key to the economic success of the state.  The development of Rhode Island was shaped 
by labor and industry as  “Providence, Pawtucket, Woonsocket, and a host of mill villages gained 
supremacy and dictated the direction of the state for the next century.”13
II.  Labor’s Ups & Downs: National & Rhode Island Labor Movements, 1800-1900
Early opponents of organized labor believed that a group could inflict a greater level of 
damage in the business world than the individual.14  This belief led to a fear of organized labor.  
The earliest labor union, The Federal Society of Cordwainers, faced difficulties.  As the trade 
market expanded and goods from different parts of the world flooded into the United States, the 
small shoemakers of Philadelphia struggled to compete in this international market.  As the 
supply of shoes on the market increased and demand for local goods decreased, storeowners
reduced the amount they paid to their workmen, the cordwainers.  The Federal Society of 
Cordwainers worked collectively to reverse this trend by staging several strikes in Philadelphia 
in the late eighteenth century.  In 1805, in Commonwealth v. Pullis, the members of the 
cordwainers’ union were charged with the common law crime of “conspiracy to raise their 
wages.”15  The common law definition of conspiracy held that “a conspiracy is a combination of 
two or more persons by concerted action to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or to 
12 Ibid., 59
13 Ibid.
14
 E.B. McNatt, “Labor Again Menaced By the Sherman Act,” Southern Economic Journal 6 (1939), 200.
15
 Walter Nelles, “The First American Labor Case,” 41 Yale Law Review 165, 168 (1939).
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accomplish some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful by criminal or unlawful means. If the 
purpose be unlawful, it may not be carried out, even by means that otherwise would be legal; and 
although the purpose be lawful, it may not be carried out by criminal or unlawful means.”16
Under this definition, the cordwainers were found guilty of conspiracy and required to pay a 
heavy fine.  Organized labor did not fare well in its first encounter with the law.
Organized labor, once again, faced off against the legal system in the Massachusetts case 
Commonwealth v. Hunt in 1842.  Benjamin Hunt, president of the Boston Journeymen 
Bootmakers’ Society, and his fellow union members refused to work for any employer who hired 
non-union journeymen.  In September 1840, business owner Isaac Wait disregarded the union’s 
warnings and hired a non-union man, Jeremiah Horne.  Consequently all of his workers 
threatened to quit.  Faced with the destruction of his enterprises, Wait dismissed Horne.  The 
union members were prosecuted under the definition of conspiracy for depriving Wait and other 
employers of their ability to conduct business.  
At the first trial, the workers were found guilty; however, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court, under the leadership of Justice Lemuel Shaw, would use this case to set an 
important precedent in regard to the rights of unions.  Instead of finding unions contrary to law, 
Shaw ruled, “that associations may be entered into, the object of which is to adopt measures that 
may have a tendency to impoverish another, that is, to diminish his gains and profits, and yet so 
far from being criminal or unlawful, the object may be highly meritorious and public spirited.”17
Shaw set forth the belief that every labor case must be decided on its own merits.  Even with this 
vindication, unions were not given complete free rein in the business world.  The courts, before 
16
 “Headnote,” Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. 111 (1842).
17 Ibid., 134.
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determining the legality of a union, had to look at the means by  which it achieved its goals.  Only 
if the means were legal were the unions legal.
This initial endorsement of unions did not last for very long.  In 1890 Congress passed 
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.  This legislation was designed to stop the concentration of 
industries, such as steel and oil, from falling into the hands of a few companies.  This legislative 
policy declared “every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among several States, or with foreign nations”18 illegal.  However, 
as time would show, there were two ways in which to interpret the Sherman Act and what 
constituted interstate commerce.  A narrow interpretation of interstate commerce and the act 
eventually allowed big business to defeat governmental regulation.  However, a broad 
interpretation of commerce and the Sherman Act would allow the anti-trust legislation to be 
applied to labor unions even though the act contained no language dealing with labor.  The vague 
wording of the Sherman Act left the interpretation, application, and enforcement of this act to the 
courts in the United States.  
Less than five years after Congress passed this legislation, the Sherman Act became a 
device by which government and business could suffocate the expanding labor movement.  The 
first attempt to expand the meaning of the Sherman Act to include labor occurred in 1895 during 
In re Debs.  The Pullman Company of Chicago, in the early 1890s, cut the wages of its workers 
by twenty percent.  In 1894, the American Railway Union, led by Eugene V. Debs, went out on 
strike in protest of the harsh wage cuts.  A secondary strike quickly began and soon no railway 
workers would handle Pullman cars on any line.  The large extent of this strike stopped all 
transportation in and out of Chicago.  Eventually the federal government asked for an injunction 
forcing the Pullman workers back to their jobs because the strike had become a public welfare 
18 Sherman Anti-Trust Act, U.S. Code, vol 15, sec. 1 (1890).
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issue by stopping the shipment of U.S. mail.  Debs and the other union members refused to 
comply with the injunction.  When brought before the Federal Circuit Court on contempt 
charges, Debs and his attorneys maintained that the injunction was beyond judicial power.  The 
Circuit Court judge would take a novel approach to this labor problem by invoking the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Act, claiming the railway workers were conspiring to restrain trade through their 
strike.  
The Supreme Court, in its unanimous 1895 ruling in the Debs case, refrained from using 
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to stop the union strike.  In an opinion by Justice Brewer, the Court 
stated clearly “we enter into no examination of the [Sherman] act…upon which the Circuit Court 
relied mainly to sustain its jurisdiction…we prefer to rest our judgment on the broader ground 
which has been discussed in this opinion believing it of importance that the principles underlying 
it should be fully stated and affirmed.”19  Nonetheless, the Court upheld the ruling of the lower 
courts establishing the strike as a restraint on commerce.  The Court cited the Constitution as 
giving the court and government control over interstate commerce, mail delivery, and highway 
operation.  As Brewer stated, “the strong arm of the national government may be put forth to 
brush away all obstructions to the freedom of interstate commerce.”20  While the Supreme Court 
did not feel it necessary to use the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in this encounter with labor, it set 
forth some very basic views that would later be used to directly link the Sherman Act and labor 
unions.  The Court took a very broad view of what constituted commerce when including labor 
in this instance.  Later court rulings would use this same broad approach, in conjunction with 
anti-trust legislation, to stop the activities of unions.
19 In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 599 (1895).
20 Id. at p. 582.
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Rhode Island labor bucked the national trend for the state’s labor movement fared well in 
its first opposition to big business.  As soon as the first textile mills in Rhode Island opened their 
doors, conflicts between workers and employers emerged.  Labor in Rhode Island was always 
independent and rarely gave in to the demands of the mill owners.  Men would walk out of the 
factories without notice, parents would remove their children from factories for no reason, and 
workers would routinely refuse to perform certain tasks.  Despite this independent streak, 
workers saw the use of concerted activism in the 1820s with the founding of the state’s first 
union, the New England Association of Farmers, Mechanics, and Other Workingmen.  While 
across the nation early unionization movements and strikes were crushed by legal technicalities, 
the organized labor movement in Rhode Island initially met success.21
The struggles between management and labor began in a most fitting location, the 
birthplace of the textile industry, Pawtucket, RI.  The town had changed tremendously in the 
thirty-years since Samuel Slater’s mill opened.  By the 1820s, the town was home to eight 
different mills and the rapid growth of the mills had created a rift with the emergence of two 
distinct social classes, the mill owners and the textile workers.  On May 24, 1824, mill owners 
held a meeting and decided to operate the factory for one additional hour each day and to 
implement a twenty-five percent wage reduction for certain categories of workers, especially 
those composed of women.  For mill owners, these were practical and necessary actions in order 
to maximize the profit they could earn.  Between 1820 and 1824, productivity in the factories 
increased tremendously.  This, in turn, inundated the market with fabric, thus decreasing the 
price of the textiles.  At the same time, the price of raw cotton increased dramatically.  The 
actions of the Pawtucket mill owners are understandable because labor was the only economic 
21 Gary Kulik, “Pawtucket Village and the Strike of 1824: The Origins of Class Conflict in Rhode Island,” Radical History 
Review 17 (Spring 1978), 22.
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factor in their business which they could control.  In addition, the mill owners believed that since 
women were new to the workforce they would not protest the wage cuts.  They were wrong.  
Five hundred workers at the Pawtucket Cotton Manufacturing Company, also known as the 
Yellow Mill, began the first strike in the American textile industry and the first strike ever to 
include women.  
The female weavers and their male counterparts joined forces in what the press referred 
to as a turnout, not a strike.  On May 31, 1824, the Manufacturers’ and Farmers’ Journal 
reported, 
“when the laboring part of the community learned of the result of this meeting, they  
        were generally determined to work only the usual hours; and when the bell rang to 
call them to their employment, they assembled in great numbers, accompanied by 
        many who were not interested in the affair, round the doors of the mill, apparently for 
the purpose of hindering or preventing the entrance of those willing to work, no force, 
however, was used.”22
During the week-long protest, a mob of workers and townspeople rioted through the 
streets of Pawtucket.  The group surrounded the homes of the factory owners and spent the 
evening shouting at their bosses; however, little property damage was done.  Toward the end of 
the turnout, the workers became more violent for, on June 1, 1824, one mill was set on fire.  Five 
days later the Providence Journal announced, “the Pawtucket mills are again in operation, and a 
compromise settlement between the employers and the employed”23 had been reached.  The 
compromise settlement provided Rhode Island laborers with a tremendous victory because at a 
time when labor strikes often did not provided the desired results, this victory demonstrated the 
power of organized labor and its ability to force sanctions upon their employers.
22 Manufacturers’ and Farmers’ Journal, May 31, 1824; quoted in Kulik, “Pawtucket Village and the Strike of 1824: The Origins 
of Class Conflict in Rhode Island,” 22.
23 The Providence Journal, 5 June 1824, p. 1.
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Following the strike of 1824, unions emerged in only a few skilled trades such as 
carpenters, weavers, and brewers.  These groups were successful in achieving wage increases 
and improving working conditions for themselves, but did little for unskilled laborers and the 
labor movement as a whole.  The Knights of Labor attempted to form a union for both Rhode 
Island’s skilled and unskilled workers in 1882.  However, the union fell apart before the turn of 
the century because the Knights could not convince skilled and unskilled workers to join forces 
with the  Irish immigrants who led the Knights.  Between 1875 and 1930, French Canadians 
were the dominant immigrant group composing over half the city’s population and a majority of 
laborers in northern Rhode Island.  As a result, the success of any labor union required the 
cooperation and recruitment of the local French-Canadian workers.  Unfortunately for the early 
labor movement, these immigrants were not receptive to the message of labor unions.  The 
French-Canadian immigrants strove to protect their traditional culture, religion, language, and 
customs.  As a result, they remained fairly isolated from the rest of the community.  It seemed 
that these workers “cared less about improving their economic condition than about maintaining 
their French-Canadian culture.”24  By 1900, only ten percent of Rhode Island workers had 
unionized.  This small membership rendered the unions weak and unable to bring improvement 
to the workers.
III.  Downward Spiral:  Rhode Island’s Labor Disasters, 1900-1930
The new immigrants in Rhode Island were not the only portion of society hostile to 
organized labor.  By the turn of the century, the smallest state in the country was home to one of 
the strongest corrupt networks of politicians in the country.  Republican United States Senator 
Nelson Aldrich, businessman Marsden Perry, and General Charles Brayton joined forces to 
24
 Gary Gerstle, “The Mobilization of the Working Class Community: The Independent Textile Union in Woonsocket, 1931-
1946,” Radical History Review 17 (Spring 1978), 164.  
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control all major businesses in Rhode Island.  Aldrich commanded so much power in the Senate, 
he was nicknamed the “Boss of the United States.”25  In 1905, muckraking journalist Lincoln 
Steffens exposed the government’s corruption in his article, “Rhode Island: A State for Sale” 
published in McClure’s Magazine.  According to Steffens, “Rhode Island never was a 
democracy.”26  The corrupt political machine controlled by Aldrich bought votes in local and 
state elections to keep the Republican Party in control.  Republicans, nationwide and in Rhode 
Island, maintained a strict government-business partnership, which left labor helpless.  The 
wealth of the Republicans made it nearly impossible for Rhode Island Democrats “to get control 
long enough to make the needed changes without more money than they can raise in the state.”27
While Nelson and Brayton controlled state politics, Perry assumed control of Rhode Island 
business.  Within just a few years, Perry dominated all of the state’s utility companies including 
electric, waterworks, and gas.  In addition, he consolidated all of the state’s railroads under his 
Union Railway Company.
Labor could effect no change when big business owners controlled the state government.  
Yet at the same time, the organized labor of Rhode Island still tried to further its cause.  Small 
labor struggles emerged in the early twentieth century and “although these local upheavals never 
attained the notoriety of national strikes, their sheer number and similarity demand attention as a 
key to unraveling citizen frustration at the dawn of the twentieth century, a time when private 
trusts wrestled with public interest.”28
The Carmen’s Strike of 1902 provides the perfect example of the struggle of organized 
labor against the Republican political machine. Marsden Perry, himself, provoked the 
25
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Amalgamated Association of Street and Railway Employees to strike.  In the spring of 1902, the 
Rhode Island legislature passed a law limiting the hours worked by the railroad carmen to ten 
hours a day.  The law was to go into effect on June 1, 1902.  However, Perry refused to honor the 
law, arguing that it was unconstitutional to limit the hours of those who wanted to work longer 
hours.   On June 4, the “wage disparity, and the sense of political betrayal after two years of hard 
work at the statehouse, exploded into the most momentous civil disruption in Rhode Island since 
the Dorr War of 1842.”29  The carmen strike would grow to encompass seven hundred workers, 
spread to two cities, Providence and Pawtucket, and last for five weeks.  
Initially, the Carmen demonstrated great restraint with their actions against their
employer.  Car operators crowded the streets to see how many of their coworkers would break 
the strike.  That evening only twenty-four of the one hundred and thirty-seven cars were in 
operation.  In Providence the strike quickly gained notoriety.  Most notable about this strike was 
the popular support it gained from local residents. On June 6th, hundreds of carmen and 
conductors marched to the beat of a military band from Providence to the neighboring town of 
Olneyville and back while twenty thousand townspeople cheered from the roadside.  While 
support emerged from the people, the press reacted in divergent ways to this event.  The Evening 
Telegram, which favored labor, reported “enthusiasts jammed the business section of the city and 
gave rise to an outburst of popular feeling that has no parallel in the city’s history.”30  On the 
other hand, headlines in The Providence Daily Journal took the side of management describing a 
very different scene of “Cars Destroyed, the Switches Plugged, Motormen and Conductors 
Hooted at and Terrorized and the Police Officers Stoned.”31
29 Ibid., 133.
30 The Evening Telegram, June 6, 1902 quoted in Molloy, Trolley Wars: Street Car Workers On the Line, 133.
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While the stance of the press differed, the government quickly opposed the workers.  By 
June 11th, Governor Charles Kimball was forced to call in over six hundred Rhode Island 
militiamen to quell the strike.  On July 5th, the militia finally defeated the strikers by forcing 
them to end their demonstrations and marches. As a result, the local Providence union was 
forced to vote to end its strike.  Pawtucket resisted for a few days, but on July 8th, the local ended 
its strike.  It would take organized labor decades to recover from this devastating setback.
IV.  Labor’s New Deal:  Transformation in the 1930s
The 1930s became a period of tremendous change for the United States.  When the Stock 
Market crashed in October, 1929, America was plunged into a period of despair unrivaled by 
anything in the country’s history.  The ensuing depression caused a dramatic decline in business 
and commerce impacting unions tremendously.  In 1929, there were 3.5 million union members 
nationwide, but by 1933 this total dropped by fifteen percent.32  Transportation and construction 
unions were once the heart of the American labor movement; however, the Great Depression 
temporarily stopped the expenditures needed to build roads and railroads.  A lack of capital also 
ended all new construction endeavors.  Understandably many unemployed Americans dropped 
out of the unions for they felt the union could not offer them any assistance.  
Despite declining union membership, the general anti-union sentiment began to change 
during the 1930s.  In the years before the Great Depression, businessmen were the leaders of the 
country.  When depression struck the country, the American people turned towards these men to 
repair the damaged economy, but to no avail.  Business could not save the country this time.  As 
a result, President Roosevelt and the country increasingly focused on the laboring man.33 Many 
in the New Deal began to recognize the merit of unions and the possibility that these 
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organizations could help pull the country out of its economic slump.  Congress soon began a 
campaign in support of unionized workers. 
The national legislature took the first steps to protect unions in the 1930s with the 
passage of two pieces of legislation, the Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932 and the Wagner Act of 
1935.  Senator George W. Norris of Nebraska and Representative Fiorello H. La Guardia of New 
York devised the Norris-La Guardia Act.  The 1932 legislation declared,
“The individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty 
        of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms 
and conditions of employment…it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, 
self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate
the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the 
interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor…”34
The Norris-La Guardia Act went on to limit the use of injunctions by federal courts in both 
violent and nonviolent strikes.  The legislation confirmed that unions would no longer be held as 
conspiracies in restraint of trade under the Sherman Act of 1890.  It also prevented employers 
from making their workers sign or punishing employees for breaking, “yellow-dog contracts,”35
agreements that assured that workers would never join a union.  Following the passage of this 
legislation, many states followed suit and passed their own versions of the Norris-La Guardia 
Act.
The Wagner Act of 1935 is formally known as the National Labor Relations Act.  Senator 
Robert Wagner of New York initiated this bill to protect employees from their bosses.  The act 
stated, 
“Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize
and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, 
and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of 
industrial strife and unrest… It is declared hereby to be the policy of the United States 
to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of
34 Norris-La Guardia Act, U .S. Code, vol 29, sec. 101 (1932).
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 commerce.”36
In order to safeguard the rights of the employee, the act created the National Labor Relations 
Board.  The NLRB, composed of three members, was given the power to regulate labor relations 
in any industry involved in interstate commerce.  
IV.  “The Quintessential New Deal State:”  Rhode Island Labor Law, 1930-1955
The 1930s represented a decade of tremendous change not only for the nation, but also 
for Rhode Island.  The combination of a new Democratic government, New Deal legislation, and 
a change in attitudes among Rhode Island’s immigrants allowed a new era to dawn for Rhode 
Island labor.  
At the beginning of the Great Depression, through the work of Belgian unionists, the 
Independent Textile Union(ITU) made its entrance into Rhode Island.  The Belgians “knew that 
the ability of textile workers to win significant and lasting control of their lives was more than a 
dream.”37 Under the leadership of Joseph Schemts, the ITU was founded in Woonsocket in 
hopes of unionizing all textile workers.  The new union “preached solidarity, constructive 
activity, pride in labor and labor’s participation in society.”38
The problems previously faced by labor unions in Rhode Island, including the hostility of 
the French-Canadian community and yellow dog contracts, vanished in the 1930s.  By the 1920s, 
the French-Canadian isolation policy began to erode.  The economic hardships created by the 
Great Depression were enough to break down the walls surrounding these immigrant workers 
and make them more receptive to the ideas of organized labor.  During the 1930s, the ITU would 
“successfully tap the French-Canadian working class, thereby enlisting a vibrant ethnic solidarity 
36 National Labor Relations Act, U.S. Code, vol. 29, secs. 151-169 (1935).
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into the service of the union.”39  Secondly, many mills had previously prevented their workers 
from joining labor unions via yellow dog contracts.  However, the Norris-LaGuardia Act 
outlawed these contracts in 1932, thus opening the way for the ITU.  
September 1934 proved to be a pivotal moment for the ITU.  On September 1, the United 
Textile Workers called for a nationwide strike in response to Southern companies refusing to 
honor collective bargaining rights.  Across the nation, 400,000 workers immediately followed 
and went on strike.  One week later, by a vote of 1756 to 84, Woonsocket’s ITU joined the strike 
and closed down all but one mill, the Woonsocket Rayon Company.  It took an additional four 
days of fighting company guards in the streets before this mill closed.  On September 12, a mob 
of ten thousand ran through the streets of the city.  The state government was forced to call in the 
National Guard to quell the riot.  Unfortunately, the troops opened fire on the crowds and killed 
two teenagers and wounded twelve others.  By the next morning over $100,000 in damage had 
been done to the city.40
Even though labor was defeated in the nationwide 1934 textile strike, these actions, in the 
end, strengthened labor’s position in Rhode Island.  In 1934 the ITU had 1500 members.  Two 
years later it doubled, and by 1939 the union was over 10,000 members strong operating locals 
for not only textile workers, but also barbers, electricians, office workers, plumbers, store clerks, 
and shoe repairers.41  The strike also gave the ITU a larger role in the city for “as the ITU 
encompassed more and more of the workers in Woonsocket, its perception of its role changed.  
No longer content to fight for recognition and better working conditions, it assumed the 
responsibility of a community organization.  It became active in city and state politics, 
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advocating a series of reforms ranging from day-care centers for working mothers to public 
housing projects.”42  New Deal legislation, such as the Wagner Act, allowed unions, such as the 
ITU, to successfully negotiate for progressive contracts that capped the number of hours worked 
per week, guaranteed overtime pay, established grievance procedures, and formed closed shops.  
As a result, this would be the last major strike in Rhode Island for many years to come.
As Rhode Island unions sought increased rights through massive strikes such as the Great 
Textile Strike of 1934, Rhode Island law attempted to keep up with the demands for increased 
protection of laborers.  As a result, the boom of labor legislation was not confined to the national 
scene.  While legislation such as the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the National Labor Relations Act 
dictated policy and set forth general guidelines across the country, state legislation affording 
rights to organized workers began to emerge. Due to the increasing protection provided to 
Rhode Island’s workers, historians have deemed the nation’s smallest member “the 
quintessential New Deal state.” 43
Rhode Island courts began to affirm the rights of the state’s private sector workers in 
1931 with the Supreme Court ruling in Samuel Bomes vs. Providence Local No. 223 of the 
Motion Picture Operators of the United States and Canada.  The facts of this case are fairly 
simple, yet an important decision formed as a result.  Beginning in 1927, the relationship
between the unionized motion picture operators and the owner of the Liberty Theatre began to 
sour.  Members of the union attempted to force the theater’s owner into employing only 
unionized men at his facility by picketing the establishment.  Union men wore placards 
proclaiming, “This theatre does not employ union moving picture machine operators affiliated 
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with the American Federation of Labor.”44  Additionally, the picketers stopped patrons who were 
trying to enter the theater.  In order to deter business, moviegoers were accosted and told “I 
know you won't go into a scab place, a non-union place.”45  The picket was successful and the 
theater began to rapidly lose money.  
The ensuing court case began however hesitantly, the Rhode Island judiciary’s protection 
of labor’s rights.  The trial judge found in favor of Bomes and issued an injunction to prevent 
further picketing by the union directly in front of the theater.  On appeal a mixed result was 
achieved.  The Supreme Court rightly acknowledged that this was a new frontier for state law,
because no plaintiff had ever challenged the right to picket a business establishment.  After a
vain attempt to find precedent elsewhere in the nation, the opinion noted, “the decisions on that 
question in the State and Federal courts and the reasons therefor are many and conflicting. We 
think that much of the uncertainty and confusion in the reported decisions results from the 
attempt to establish a general rule of law which shall govern in every labor controversy.”46
While the Supreme Court refused to set a definitive rule governing pickets, the three to two 
ruling affirmed the absolute right of labor unions to picket in a peaceful manner without using 
any form of coercion.  Nonetheless, in this specific case, the court ruled that the injunction was 
warranted because the picketing obstructed the public use of the street since moviegoers were 
directly confronted.  
While the Motion Picture Operators union lost the strike and their legal battle, an 
important precedent was achieved because unions secured the right to publicly protest unfair 
labor practices.  Two justices dissented in the case further demonstrating the judiciary’s 
44 Samuel Bomes vs. Providence Local No. 223 of the Motion Picture Operators of the United States and Canada, 51 R.I. 499, 
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sympathy towards organized labor.  The two dissenters argued that the pickets were not an 
obstruction, but rather were a “lawful and proper”47 demonstration necessary to inform the public 
that union labor was not employed at the theater.  
In the early 1940s, Rhode Island workers scored a tremendous victory as the legislature 
passed the Rhode Island State Labor Relations Act.  The 1941 Act reaffirmed two crucial rights 
for the state’s private sector workers.  Section 1 reaffirmed a worker’s right to unionize by 
proclaiming,  
“Employees shall have the right of self organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, 
and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection free from interference, restraint, or coercion from any 
source.”48
A later section in the state’s Labor Relations Act reiterated a union’s right to strike: 
“Nothing in this act shall be construed so as to interfere with, impede or diminish in 
any way the right of employees to strike or engage in other lawful, concerted 
activities.”49
Although the act’s language is virtually identical to that of the National Labor Relations Act, it 
covers workers not included in the federal legislation.  Additionally, it provided workers an extra 
layer of protection against the abuses formerly endured by guaranteeing basic rights.  Although 
this statue has been revised several times, it remains the guiding principle in Rhode Island labor 
law to this day.
In 1951, the Legislature amended Rhode Island General Law to provide an anti-
injunction statue designed to further protect workers’ rights.  The new law stated, “No court of 
this state shall have jurisdiction to issue a temporary or permanent  injunction in any case 
involving a labor dispute, except after hearing the testimony of witnesses in open court, with 
47 Id. at p. 505.
48 Rhode Island Labor Relations Act, Rhode Island General Law, Title 28, Chapter 28-7, sec. 12 (1941).
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opportunity for cross-examination, in support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath, 
and testimony in opposition thereto.”50  Courts could no longer halt a union strike without giving 
workers their day in court to present their side of the argument.  
Five years later, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the anti-injunction law in
Lindsey Tavern, Inc. v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, Local 307.  In August 1955, employees 
at the tavern began to organize and form a new local.  However, the owners of the bar did not 
approve of these actions and the lead organizer, a bartender, was fired.  On September 29, 1955 
the tavern’s workers went out on strike for increased wages, better hours, and job security.  The 
workers asked the Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union, a division of the American 
Federation of Labor, to represent their interests, even though not all of the striking workers had 
joined the union.  A legal question arose when a Superior Court judge issued an injunction to 
stop the picketing before he heard testimony from either party.  The trial judge issued the 
injunction even though he felt, “the picketing appears to have been peaceful for the most part… 
The picketing that is being done is for organizational purposes.”51 The judge’s choice to issue 
an injunction in spite of the circumstances was an ironic move because, according to the Bomes
case, picketing in a peaceful manner without obstructing business was legal.  On appeal, the 
Supreme Court overturned the injunction and reaffirmed Rhode Island’s anti-injunction law.  
The Supreme Court argued that as long as the workers were not directly trying to exert economic 
pressure on the tavern or customers, the strike was legal.  This action further strengthened the 
rights of union workers within the state.
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VII.  Moving Out:  The Decline of Private Sector Labor in Rhode Island, 1950-Present
While the Great Strike of 1934 and the subsequent legal developments initially 
strengthened labor’s position in Rhode Island, it also hastened the downfall of Rhode Island’s 
most prominent industry and employer- the textile mill.  Thomas Geoghean, in his study of the 
decline of industrial labor in Chicago commented, the “people in South Chicago thought the 
mills would last forever.  They thought of them in public utilities.”52  Rhode Islanders, too, 
incorrectly thought the mills would last forever.  
Following World War II, mills and factories began closing at an alarming rate.  Without 
the wartime contracts, large companies such as Franklin Machine and Foundry immediately went 
out of business.  Also, the end of the war decreased the need for cotton, thus reducing the 
business of the textile mills.  In October and November 1945, labor unions went on strike in 
most mills demanding closed shop policies and the continuation of the high wartime wages.  
Mills were unable, or chose not, to meet the demands of northern labor and began to close.  By 
1953, nineteen mills had been shuttered.53  Guerin Mill in Woonsocket, one of the largest textile 
mills, closed after workers refused a wage cut resulting in the loss of over a thousand jobs.  The 
following year, the former “Industrial Wonders of the World” began to relocate.  Nicholson File 
Company moved its facilities out of state after a five-month strike damaged its business.  By 
1982, the textile industry labor force had decreased seventy-five percent and 43,000 workers had 
lost their jobs.54
In the modern era, cheap overseas and southern labor provided industry with alternatives 
to northern labor and opportunities to earn more profit.  With these options, management gained 
power and labor unions lost their place of prominence.  Large business demanded that state 
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Figure 2: Pictorial Illustration of the Rise and Fall of Rhode Island’s Textile Industry.
Top picture shows the Lippett Woolen Mill in 1875.  The bottom picture highlights the 
same facility, in a dilapidated state, as it existed in 1981.
Source:  “Images of Rhode Island,”  Woonsocket Public Library Historical Collection; 
      available from http://www.quickpix.com/cgi-win/IICGI.exe/woonsocket; Internet; 
accessed 2 March 2005.
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legislatures repeal strikers’ benefits, reduce workers’ compensation rates, and lower taxes.  
However, even the threat of further unemployment did not deter the strong willed Rhode Island 
laborers.  
On March 22, 1982, industrial workers at the Browne & Sharpe machine tool workers 
company in North Kingstown went on strike.  This strike “signaled the end of two decades of 
labor and management cooperation.”55  During this strike labor overestimated its power.  Strikers 
lined their cars along the entrance road, stood outside the factory, threw rocks at scabs, and sang 
“We Shall Not Be Moved.”  Despite the efforts of labor, the strike was unsuccessful.  Rhode 
Island labor historian, Paul Buhle called 1982 the “end of the Craftsmen’s era.”56  John Coen, a 
machinist at Browne & Sharpe and an officer in the International Association of Machinists, 
explained the strike’s failure.  He said, “when you bring in a whole new generation of workers, 
and they hadn’t been involved in the original organizing or the hard fights to get 
contracts…you’re going to get a very small percentage that are really going to feel, you know, 
what unionism is all about and what it means.”57  The old feeling of unionism in the private 
sector was gone in both Rhode Island and across the nation.  
Today, labor unionism and activism in the private sector has greatly diminished.  In 
Rhode Island “the architectural landscape throughout the state is dotted with hulking ghosts of 
abandoned buildings, with gables and belfries staring down on the deteriorating mill villages that 
will never recover except as suburban sprawl.”58  In the last two decades, for the few remaining 
private sector unions both in Rhode Island and nationwide, “it has been insane to go on strike.  
Every strike ends in disaster.  The members go out, roaring mad, like in the old days.  Then they 
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watch the ‘crossovers’ add up, day by day, watch until they reach the magic number, tip the 
balance, and the company can start up again, nonunion, and bust the strike.”59  The 1980s held 
the potential for a resurgence of labor when wages fell and the gap between the rich and the poor 
increased; however, the revival never occurred.
Due to the independent character of Rhode Island laborers and their desire to push for 
rights, even after years of defeat and setbacks, the country’s smallest state has one of the largest 
and richest labor histories.  One hundred and eighty years ago, Rhode Islanders launched the first 
strike in the textile industry and successfully achieved their goals at a time when labor 
movements were usually crushed.  Today, labor in Rhode Island continues to defy the odds and 
the legacy of organized labor remains a potent force in the state.  As organized private sector 
labor has declined, the state’s public sector employees have picked up the slack to continue 
Rhode Island’s quest for increasing labor rights.  
59
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CHAPTER 2: 
Law & Legislation Concerning Public Sector Labor Unions
 George Meany, the first president of the AFL-CIO declared during a postal workers 
strike in 1970, “employees of the government have exactly the same desires and aspirations as do 
employees in the private sector.”60  Police officers, fire fighters and teachers, just like skilled 
craftsmen and factory workers seek a safe working environment, adequate compensation for 
their services, and fair treatment by their employers.  In order to protect their interests, workers 
in all industries routinely seek the right to organize and strike.  However, public sector workers 
have faced prolonged opposition to their struggle to unionize and strike even greater than that 
confronting their private sector counterparts.  
The rights of public employees have been under debate, for over a century, because their 
interests were often placed subservient to the operation of the government and their demands 
marginalized. National legislation, which during the New Deal clarified the rights of private 
sector workers, never materialized for all government workers.  As a result, the legal rights of 
millions of Americans were left in a state of flux and subject to “a hodgepodge of statues, 
ordinances, attorney general opinions, and court decisions.”61  Through these actions, public 
employees were granted a limited set of rights which were far more restrictive than those 
existing in the private sector.  Examining the legal developments of public sector labor regarding 
the right to organize and strike, paints a clear picture of the long and arduous battle fought by 
government employees.   
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I.  Encounters with the Law:  Public Sector Employees & the Law, 1900-1912
From the nineteenth century until the New Deal, mention of public sector labor rights 
was conspicuously absent from legislation conferring rights to private sector workers.  However, 
the absence of the public sector does not imply that government workers were ignored.  Instead 
right from the start, public employees’ attempts to expand their rights were vehemently opposed.  
Public sector workers, particularly federal workers, first clamored for increased rights in the 
early nineteenth century, but achieved little success. For example, in 1835, mechanics at the 
Navy shipyards in Washington, DC demanded a reduction in hours from twelve to ten hour work 
days.  The Secretary of the Navy refused this demand and all workers returned to their jobs under 
the previous working conditions.62
At the opening of the twentieth century, activism increased, labor organizations 
expanded, and the government took swift action to curtail their efforts.  Workers employed in 
government owned factories and shipyards were able to belong to the private sector unions 
governing the particular occupation.63  When the largest group of federal workers, the postal 
carriers, demanded increased pay and rights, their efforts were quickly stopped by the 
government.  This difference in treatment first highlighted the atypical nature of government 
employment in fields where there was no private sector counterpart.  Beginning in 1895, the 
Postmaster General put forth rules restricting the actions postal workers could take to improve 
their wages and working conditions.  One particularly restrictive rule prohibited postal workers 
from lobbying Congress under any circumstances.  Postal workers continually tried to assert 
increased power by forming several different groups, including the National Association of the 
Post Office Clerks of the United States, the United Association of Postal Clerks, and the National 
62 Spero, Government as Employer, 79.
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Association of Letter Carriers in 1896.  However, their efforts to improve wages and working 
conditions met very limited success.64
By 1901, the Postmaster General’s rules fell by the wayside in a fervor of postal worker 
activism.  The National Association of Letter Carriers, unhappy with the laws governing the 
salaries of its members, lobbied Congress for improved wages.  President Theodore Roosevelt, 
who had promised to aid mail carriers during his campaign, came out in opposition to the union 
because it continually ignored the anti-lobbying rules and aggravated the members of Congress.  
Under pressure from the U.S. Post Office and Congress, Roosevelt put forth the first presidential
order limiting the rights of government employees.  On January 31, 1902, in his infamous gag 
order, Roosevelt prohibited federal employees from “directly or indirectly or through 
associations”65 seeking legislation on their own behalf.  He instituted a strict penalty of job 
dismissal for anyone who undertook these actions.  Four years later, the President expanded the 
scope of his gag order.  The new order decreed, 
“All officers and employees of the United States of every department, serving in or 
under any of the Executive Departments or independent Government establishments, 
and whether serving in or out of Washington, are hereby forbidden, either directly or
indirectly, individually or through associations, to solicit an increase of pay or to 
influence in their own interest any other legislation whatever, either before Congress 
        or its Committees, or in any way save through the heads of the Department or 
independent Government establishments, in or under which they serve, on penalty of 
dismissal from the Government service.”66
Limiting the rights of American workers to belong to associations and advocate for improved 
working conditions runs contrary to the basic tenets of American democracy and denies federal 
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workers their constitutional right to petition the government.  The “dubious constitutionality”67
of these gag orders immediately came under siege from the labor community.  
The American Federation of Labor (AFL), under the leadership of its president Samuel 
Gompers, took an early interest in the struggles of government employees.  Leaders of the AFL 
felt “there is a law of growth, progress, and evolution in the labor movement as sure as the law of 
life.”68  This belief obliged the national union leaders to aid federal worker unionization efforts.  
At the AFL’s national convention in 1905, the organization made attempts to draw federal labor 
unions into the national movement.  The AFL selected five federal labor union representatives to 
serve on the newly established Committee on Federal Labor Unions.  The purpose of this 
committee was to propose a series of ways in which the AFL platform could accurately and 
adequately reflect the needs and interests of federal workers.  On March 26, 1906, the Executive 
Board of the AFL drafted a letter expressing labor’s grievances with recent governmental 
policies regarding their own employees.  The letter was sent directly to President Roosevelt and 
the presiding officers of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives.  It asserted that remedies 
to their grievances went hand in hand with the “progress and development made necessary by 
changed industrial conditions.”69
Public sector labor law is a history of inaction on the part of the national government.  
Despite the protests of the AFL, neither the President nor Congress addressed the rights of 
federal employees.  Indeed, three years later President Taft issued his own gag order denying 
federal employees the right to directly respond to any inquiries regarding their employment made 
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by members of Congress.70  At the annual conference of the American Federation of Labor in 
1912, Gompers reflected on the impact these gag orders had on American workers.  In a speech 
before the membership he said, “the departmental Government employes were gagged and their 
hands tied, without any means of redress.”71  Employees were forced to seek aid regarding any 
and all problems from their department heads which were often the cause of the problem.  Many 
federal workers, especially the postal workers, turned to the AFL for assistance in remedying 
their dire situation.  However, as the AFL began to intervene, employers exerted pressure on 
these men and forced many to seek other positions outside of government service.  The AFL 
persisted because Gompers believed that “the American people are not yet ready to take the 
position that because an individual accepts employment from the Government he thereby forfeits 
his rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution of the United States.”72
Outright persecution of federal employees by the executive branch ended in 1912 when 
Congress passed the one and only piece of national legislation enhancing the rights of public 
sector workers.  As a result of intense lobbying by the American Federation of Labor, Congress 
adopted the Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912 which stated, 
“the membership in any society, association, club or other form of organization of 
postal employees not affiliated with any outside organization imposing an obligation 
or duty upon them to engage in any strike, or propose in assisting them in any strike, 
against the United States, having for its object, among other things, the improvements
 in the condition of labor of its members, including the hours of labor and compensation
 therefor and leave of absence, by any person or groups of persons in said postal service, 
or the presenting by such any person or groups of persons of any grievance or 
grievances to the Congress or any member thereof shall not constitute or be cause for 
reduction in rank or compensation or removal of any person or groups of persons from 
said service.”73
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Despite the AFL’s support in pursuing the Lloyd- LaFollette Act, little was published by 
the organization after it was passed.  The group was conspicuously silent about this large step 
forward for public workers.  However, the United Postal Clerk did report in August 1912 that 
Gompers approved the final language of the act.  Those who opposed this legislation did not 
remain silent.  The coverage in The New York Times, an anti-labor paper in 1912, announced, 
“there were inspired intimations that the President would veto the bill.”74  Since the veto was 
never issued, this piece of legislation advanced the standing of government workers by 
overturning the harsh restrictions imposed by the gag orders and allowed workers to affiliate 
with outside labor organizations.  The act, although restricted to postal workers, was seen by 
federal workers as a precursor to a broader piece of legislation which would formalize these 
rights for all government workers.  
II. “Strike Against Public Safety:” The Boston Police Strike of 1919
Any possible advantage offered to public workers through the Lloyd-LaFollette Act was 
curtailed by the Boston Police Strike of 1919.  Although this was a local strike, the actions of the 
Boston police made the conflict between government and their employees clear for the entire 
nation to see.  For months, the Boston police had been advocating for a pay increase, but to little 
avail.  On August 9, 1919 the Boston police force applied to the American Federation of Labor 
for a charter in order to be formally recognized as a union.  For twenty years, the AFL had 
opposed the unionization of policemen.  However, after seeing the struggles occurring in Boston 
and cities across the nation, at their national convention in 1919 the AFL lifted its ban on police 
unions.  President Samuel Gompers reflecting on this change in policy said, “The policemen 
have appealed to me, coming clandestinely and secretively for fear they might be seen and 
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spotted and victimized, as many of them have been, to try and get some relief in a way that they 
cannot get in their existing form of organization.”75
Police department rules prohibited the officers from forming connections with any 
outside organization.  The conflict escalated when the Boston police formed Local 16, The 
Boston Policeman’s Union, of the AFL.  In late August, Police Commissioner Edwin U. Curtis 
began trying union officials for violating police regulations.  On September 8, nineteen police 
officers were suspended.  As a result, 1,117 police went on strike the following day.  Residents 
of Boston took advantage of the weakened police presence in the city and a crime spree erupted, 
store windows were broken, merchandise was stolen, and people gambled in public.  Under the 
supervision of Governor Calvin Coolidge, the Massachusetts State Guard was called in to end 
the riots and, in the process, killed five people.  The Police Commissioner broke the strike when 
he hired an entirely new police force.
The aftermath of the Boston police strike hindered the progress of public sector workers 
for years.  Essentially this strike highlighted the differences between public and private sector 
workers.  The police believed they were striking for increased benefits from their employers 
much like their private sector counterparts had done in the past.  In the eyes of the press and 
government officials, the Boston police strike was not a labor dispute, but rather was an attempt 
to create political unrest and harm the government.  From the Boston police strike emerged the 
natural assumption of why government employees needed to be treated differently from their 
private sector counterparts.  Government employees such as police, teachers, and firefighters 
were concentrated in fields which directly impacted the health, safety, and well being of the 
general population.  As a result, it was felt that government employees must be held to a higher
75
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standard than manual laborers.  Governor Coolidge expressed this concern succinctly when he 
announced, “there is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, any 
time.”76  The 1919 event associated public employee strikes with civic unrest and upheaval.  
Following the strike, “judges could not imagine giving public workers such rights.”77 This 
marked the opening of a period of judicial opposition, at the state and national levels, to public 
employee strikes.
In the coming years, the Lloyd-LaFollette Act degenerated into a toothless piece of 
legislation because the courts would not enforce the penalties and sanctions prescribed by the 
act.  A 1939 case before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia proved the 
ineffectiveness of the law.  Jonathan Levine, a union worker employed at the New York Post 
Office, was dismissed from his position because he wrote newspaper articles lobbying for 
increased job protection after a co-worker was unjustly fired.  Levine asserted that his actions 
were covered under the Lloyd-LaFollette Act.  As a union member, he felt he was guaranteed the 
right to lobby for improved working conditions.  The three judge panel denied and trivialized his 
assertion by claiming that “the printed volumes of our reports are full of cases where aggrieved 
government employees have sought mandamus either to compel reinstatement or to correct their 
official status.”78  In Levine v. Farley, the court failed to uphold the prescriptions and rights 
guaranteed by the Lloyd-LaFollette Act.  Following this case, the act was nothing more than 
“mere moral remonstrances, unenforceable if the employing authorities choose to circumvent 
them.”79  Once again workers were left at the mercy of their employers for the United States 
Supreme Court refused to examine this issue on appeal.
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Despite the weakness of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act and the setback dealt by the Boston 
police strike, public sector workers continued their struggle.  Government workers, from 1912 to 
mid-century, began an intense campaign for the same legal rights afforded to private sector 
workers.  These years saw the rapid expansion of public sector unions.  The American 
Federation of Teachers was founded in 1916.  Several umbrella unions, such as the National 
Federation of Federal Employees, formed in 1917. The International Association of Fire Fighters 
was founded in 1918.  Local police organizations began affiliating with the AFL in 1919.  The 
American Federation of Government Employees and the National Association of Government 
Employees started within a few years.  Not only did new unions emerge, but union membership 
quickly increased.  For example, the American Federation of Teachers, at its founding in 1916, 
had just 4,500 members in the Chicago area, but had grown to 32,000 members nationwide
within 15 years.80
III. “Not a Simple Task:” Creation of a National Federal Employee Policy, 1947-1962
Despite the increasing unionism, government workers were virtually ignored by the law 
for thirty years following the Lloyd-LaFollette Act.  The New Deal legislation which cemented 
the rights of private sector workers to organize, bargain, and strike did not impact the legal rights 
of public sector workers.  Instead, the legislation solidified the divide between public and private 
sector labor and launched government workers on their own crusade for increased legal rights.  
By granting the private sector explicit rights, the legislature made it clear that private sector 
workers were in class apart from the public sector.  The silence of Congress regarding the future 
of the public sector labor movement left government employees in a capricious position for 
many years.  However, during the 80th Congress (1947-1948), public sector labor was delivered a 
direct blow.  The Labor-Management Relations Act, more commonly known as the Taft-Hartley 
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Act, reaffirmed the rights of private sector workers to unionize, participate in collective 
bargaining, and be free from coercion.  The act, also, became the first piece of federal legislation 
to jointly mention public and private sector workers.  Section 305 of the act proclaimed, 
“it shall be unlawful for any individual employed by the United States or any agency 
thereof including wholly owned Government corporations to participate in any strike.  
Any individual employed by the United States or by any such agency, who strikes, 
shall be discharged from his employment, and shall forfeit his civil service status.”81
The Taft-Hartley Act represented a setback for public sector employees.  However, it reaffirmed 
basic rights of the NLRA, but came down hard on government employees.  The passage of this 
legislation was deeply resented by the American Federation of Labor for they felt, “the post-war 
years have seen a concerted employer-led drive to weaken the labor legislation enacted during 
the New Deal era.  The Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 was the first breach.”82
A slow but steady change in sentiment began to take hold in the government.  The 
Rhodes- Johnston Bill, first proposed in 1949, attempted to define and regulate the labor-
management relationship in the federal public sector.  The bill included many provisions, such as 
giving officers of national unions the right to present the grievances of their members before the 
appropriate body; requiring union officers and management representatives to work 
collaboratively in regards to safety in the workplace and grievances; development of clear 
regulations allowing government unions to conduct any lawful activity, but excluding the right to 
strike; forcing unresolved disputes into binding arbitration; and, finally, the establishment of a 
Civil Service Commission to oversee all aspects of this relationship.  Despite several years of 
study by Congress, the bill’s failure during the 1950s, demonstrated that the country was still not 
quite ready to legally define the rights of all public sector workers or treat the government like 
any other industry.
81 Taft Hartley Act, U.S. Code, vol. 201, sec. 305 (1947).
82
 “Labor and the Law,” AFL-CIO American Federationist, January 1962, 20.
41
While Congress was not ready to pass legislation benefiting public sector labor unions, 
the executive branch took action.  President John F. Kennedy revolutionized the rights of 
government workers and initiated a period of substantial growth early in his term.  Organized 
labor had been a staunch supporter of President John F. Kennedy throughout his campaign.  As a 
result, Kennedy rewarded labor’s efforts by commissioning the Task Force on Employee-
Management Relations in the Federal Sector.  On June 22, 1961, in establishing the task force, he 
stated,
“I know this is not a simple task.  The diversity of federal programs, the variety of 
occupations and the skills represented in federal employment, the different   
organizational patterns of federal departments and agencies, and the special obligations 
of public service complicate the task of formulating government-wide policy guidance. 
 Nevertheless, this important subject matter requires prompt attention.”83
Members of this committee included key figures such as Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, 
White House Chief Counsel Theodore Sorenson, and the Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg.
For over a year, the Task Force conducted public hearings with representatives from a variety of 
federal departments and invited every federal department to submit written recommendations 
regarding a federal employee policy.  
Kennedy’s challenge to create a nationwide policy was met on November 30, 1961.  The 
Task Force’s report proclaimed, “It is improper for government to fail to extend to its employees 
the same privileges enjoyed by employees of private industry as the result of government 
intervention.”84  The report also concluded that labor unions strengthened rather than weakened 
or threatened the government.  With little explanation, however, the Task Force denied public 
sector workers the right to strike.  The report only said, “it is evident that the recourses open to 
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private employers and employees such as strike action are not available to their counterparts in 
government.”85
Kennedy’s first executive order on this issue, in 1962, took rudimentary steps to ensure 
the fair treatment of labor.  The order called for “safeguards to protect employees against 
arbitrary and adverse actions.”86  The second order, Executive Order 10,988 entitled “Employee-
Management Cooperation in the Federal System” supplemented the Lloyd-LaFollette Act by 
proclaiming, “employees of the Federal Government shall have, and shall be protected in the 
exercise of, the right, freely and without penalty or reprisal, to form, join and assist any 
employee organization or to refrain from any such activity.”87  While the issuance of this order 
marked a monumental achievement for federal employees, it also clearly stated the right to join a
union “shall not include any organization which asserts the right to strike against the 
Government of the United States or any agency thereof, or to assist or participate in any such 
strike, or which imposes a duty or obligation to conduct, assist or participate in any such 
strike.”88  For the first time, increasing the rights of government employees was warmly received 
by the public because these orders provided as the New York Times noted, a “framework for a 
more efficient civil service in the interest of 185,000,000 employers: the people of the United 
States.”89
IV. “States as Laboratories:” State Based Public Sector Labor Law & Education
Federal government workers made significant steps forward in the first half of the 
twentieth century, yet the struggle by public sector workers did not cease.  Kennedy’s executive 
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orders only protected the rights of federal government workers to unionize.  Unfortunately for 
74.5 percent of the public sector workforce90 which, in 1962, were employed by state and local 
governments, the law still did not define their legal rights to organize or strike.  At the state level 
the question of public sector workers was often left to the state judiciary.  Each state was forced 
to develop their own ways to cope with public activism and “although it may be trite to speak of 
the states as laboratories experimenting with different approaches to problems, that 
characterization aptly applies to public sector impasse resolution.”91
State policy developed based on local conditions and the size of the local public sector 
labor force.  Additionally, most relevant law was judge-made which emerged only in direct 
response to a local crisis or strike by public sector workers.  Some judges would quickly ban 
organized labor all together, others limited the actions of unions, and some states took relatively 
little action.  For example, following a 1920 strike by firefighters, the Texas Court of Appeals in 
McNatt v. Lawther,92 upheld a law preventing firefighters from unionizing.  In a 1947 case, City 
of Springfield v. Clouse,93 a Missouri court allowed workers to unionize, but not engage in 
collective bargaining.  On the other hand, Virginia courts, until the 1990s, did not address public 
sector labor unions.  The diverse reactions arose primarily due to a misconception as to what 
exactly constitutes a union.  The courts immediately linked unionization with strikes for in the 
private sector the two actions developed simultaneously.  No one could imagine a union which 
would not eventually wage a strike.  While not entirely off the mark, this automatic link formed 
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between unions and strikes when added to the notion of governmental sovereignty, stimulated an 
immediate opposition to public sector labor unions.94
During the mid-twentieth century, public education represented “the new frontier of 
organized labor.”95  Public labor law, in many states, often developed around the most active 
labor organizations, teachers’ unions.  However, it is puzzling why academia became one of the 
hotbeds of organized labor.  On average, teachers composed 35 percent of government 
employees.96  Teacher unionization faced two problems.  Samuel Gompers and the AFL saw a 
distinct difference between “brain workers”97 and manual laborers.  Additionally, educational 
concerns “seemed distant, feminine, and radically alien from bread-and-butter unionism.”98
In the period between 1900 and 1950 a radical transformation occurred within the 
educational arena.  Teaching changed from a “stopgap occupation”99 to a true profession.  
Increased unionism and activism emerged as a direct result of this fundamental shift in 
education.  For many years, teaching was not considered a true profession.  Female teachers were 
often young unmarried women who were seeking to earn some money before they got married.  
In many communities, married women were not allowed to teach.  Male teachers often taught 
only until they had saved enough money to pursue their real goals, such as law school or 
engineering.  Additionally, communities maintained inane social regulations regarding dress 
codes, the company they kept, where teachers lived, and the activities pursued in leisure time.  
This transient aspect of the job and strict local control made it difficult for teachers to gain rights 
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and improved working conditions from their employers.  The teachers’ unions which existed at 
this point in time, served only as means to achieve pay raises.  
During the 1930s, a transformation in the teaching field was underway which would 
change teaching from a temporary position into a true vocation.  Until the 1930s, teachers did not 
even have to possess a high school diploma.  The Great Depression made teaching jobs difficult 
to acquire and, therefore, allowed school administration to become more selective in the 
individuals they hired.  By 1937, thirty-two states were requiring a high school diploma and one 
to four years of college.100  The moral and social restrictions were dropped during this period.  
The professionalization of American teachers reshaped the role of the teachers’ union.  
By turning teaching into a profession the bond between teachers and community leaders was 
broken.  As a result, the union emerged as a means to bridge the gap between the new profession 
and the communities in which they worked.  Teachers began to seek increased salaries and 
working conditions that were commensurate with their education levels.  Also, teaching was one 
of the few professions which was open to women and minorities right from the start.  However, 
for much of American history, women and minorities were not treated equally with their white 
male counterparts.  The growing professionalism of teachers created a problem for “inherent in 
the professionalism idea was the triumph of merit.”101 Unions were a means for these two 
groups to ensure their equality in the workplace and guarantee that merit, not gender or race, led 
to advancement in this field.  Consequently, women and minorities often took on leadership roles 
in teachers’ unions which were unprecedented in any other field.           
In many states across the nation, teachers’ unions became the most active challengers of 
the law and their government employers.  The strike evolved to be the means by which the 
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unions asserted their power.  At the state level, the right to organize was not opposed by the 
government.  Rather, states often first took action in response to strikes by public sector workers.  
Across the United States, in the 1950s, “teacher strikes were mere curiosities, occurring so 
infrequently that most policy makers rightly dismissed them as accidents or aberrations unworthy 
of close analysis.”102  Teachers’ strikes were few and far between during this decade because, as 
the baby boom generation entered school in the 1950s, there was great demand for qualified 
teachers which increased the salary of the average teacher.  As long as working conditions were 
good, levels of discontent remained low.  Teachers’ strikes averaged only three per year.103
Although there is a distinct difference between teachers and typical unionized manual 
laborers, the struggle of teachers’ unions against their employers can serve as a microcosm of the 
public sector labor dispute at the state level.  The actions taken by teachers would eventually be 
mirrored in other state level government agencies.  
V.  Militant Teachers:  Emergence of the Rhode Island Public Sector Labor Law
As a state with a firm tradition of organized and active labor, Rhode Island provides a 
perfect environment in which to examine the development of state public sector labor law.  In the 
early 1970s, Rhode Island ranked number one in the nation for the percentage of unionized 
government employees.104  In this state all public sector labor law developed around teachers for 
they were the most active organized group in Rhode Island.  The actions taken by the Rhode 
Island courts to define the rights of public school teachers illustrates the long and arduous battle 
other public labor unions would eventually fight.  At the same time, these actions revealed the 
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attitudes of the courts and other government officials’ attitudes towards public sector 
unionization. 
The law regarding public sector unions in Rhode Island developed ahead of the national 
trend because Rhode Island teachers began early to seek additional rights.  Organized labor 
activism in Rhode Island, in both the public and private sector, always preceded the national 
trend.  In the late 1940s, a few brief strikes were launched by Rhode Island teachers.  These 
events, like many early teachers strikes, were virtually ignored.  On December 5, 1946, 
Superintendent of Schools in Providence, Dr. James Hanley, in an attempt to dissuade future 
opposition, made the city’s position clear in a memo issued to all city teachers which read, 
“Teachers are government employees.  Government employees are expressly excepted 
in the National Labor Relations Act and the State Labor Relations Act which regulate 
collective bargaining and the right to strike in the private industry…a strike by teachers 
is entirely different from a strike by workers in private industry.  The School 
Committee is a public body, a government agency, representative of the citizens of 
Providence and a strike against the School Committee, therefore, is a strike against the 
public, a strike against the Government.”105
Providence teachers did not heed Hanley’s warning and began to take aggressive action 
against the city in the late 1940s.  Beginning in 1946, a salary dispute between the teachers and 
the Providence School Committee emerged.  The Providence Teachers’ Union formed as a result 
of this salary dispute.  City teachers had always belonged to an informal organization, the 
Providence Teachers’ Association.  When this group could not solve the salary dispute, the union 
was founded in 1947 and membership rapidly grew until the union was the dominant teachers’ 
organization in the city.  The Providence Teachers’ Union engaged in a one day strike in 1948 
regarding the disputed salary scales.  However, this brief strike resolved nothing and tensions 
between Providence teachers and the city continued to escalate.  In 1952, the relationship 
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between the teachers and the school committee reached its breaking point.  On March 8, 1952, 
over seven hundred members of the Providence Teachers’ Union took to the streets after their 
call for a $400 raise was denied by the school committee.  Their actions closed sixty-nine 
schools leaving twenty-six thousand students out of school.  This time the administration noticed 
and was left wondering “if there was any other city in the country where the teachers had struck 
twice.”106
It was during this strike that Rhode Islanders, both in the government and among the 
public, began to seriously debate whether or not teachers had the right to strike.  While the actual 
ten-day strike was not particularly interesting, the reaction to the strike demonstrates the divided 
opinion of teachers, government officials, and the public over the nature and legal rights of 
public sector workers.  Newspaper coverage and a series of interviews conducted after the strike 
clearly illustrate the diverse opinions.  Providence teachers were split over the work stoppage.  
Seven hundred teachers may have walked out, but two hundred teachers remained part of the 
separate entity, the Providence Teachers’ Association, which believed “teaching is a profession 
and is not to be equated with that of a laborer.”107  These divided opinions reflect the division 
among this profession whether they should join unions and strike.  A unionized teacher remarked 
“a strong teachers’ union is the only salvation of the teachers who individually are at the mercy 
of the public, the press, and the school committee.”108  In regards to the strike, this teacher felt 
“that regardless of whether one is a public servant or not, when legitimate requests are ignored 
by those in power a strike is justified to secure some action on part of the public officials.”109  On 
the other side, Association leader Theresa Trifari opposed the strike, because “for the sake and 
106
 “Teachers Ready to go on Strike,” The Providence Journal, 8 March 1952, p. 4.
107
  Watson, “A Report on the Providence Public School Strike of 1952,” 74.
108 Ibid., 72.
109 Ibid.
49
welfare of everyone and the welfare of the children”110 the schools must be kept open.  This 
group put forth an alternative plan which asked for a smaller pay increase.  Trifari believed the 
teachers of the city would accept her plan because the teachers “are willing to sacrifice personal 
gain for the good of all.”111
Teachers were not the only group to have different opinions over the right to strike.  
Several government officials adopted the same anti-public sector union stance that had 
developed in opposition to federal workers.  Dr. Hanley again warned teachers that “they may 
hurt themselves in public favor if they strike.  A strike by teachers is not like a strike by an 
industrial group…because too many parents and their children are affected.”112  Also, James 
Gallogly, chairman of the School Committee, labeled the strike “unwarranted, unlawful, a 
challenge to a legally constituted authority, a serious disservice to the people of the city and a 
threat to the welfare of the teachers themselves.”113  Not all local government officials opposed 
the strike.  In fact many, including the union counsel, Assistant Superintendent, and the union 
negotiator, cited the apathetic attitudes of the community and school committee as just cause for 
a strike.  Additional support was garnered from members of the community.  On March 11, 
1952, the Parent-Teacher Association marched on City Hall, where President Tancredi Paolino 
announced, “we are behind the teachers and we deplore the condition that brought about the 
strike and urge that negotiations be reopened in good faith.”114  While this strike began the 
debate over teachers’ legal rights, the dispute was kept entirely out of the court system.  
Negotiations continued throughout the summer of 1952 until an acceptable solution was reached 
providing the teachers with a slightly lower salary increase than they had desired.  Therefore, no 
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significant legal measures were created to define the rights of teachers and unions.  As a result, 
the debate would continue for many more years. 
In 1957, Rhode Island public sector labor law began to take shape as yet another 
teachers’ strike erupted.  On March, 26, 1957 teachers in the city of Pawtucket threatened to 
strike unless a new contract agreement was reached.  Union members did not relish this idea, but 
according to the union’s president, a strike was the “only effective means we have of dealing 
with these people (the School Committee) and getting any salary relief.”115  When relief was not 
found by the fall of 1957, four hundred teachers failed to report for work on the first day of the 
1957-58 school year.
Once again no uniform view of the strike emerged.  Providence Journal reporter Joseph 
Kelly took a harsh swing at teachers with his article, “Why a Strike?” published on September 8, 
1957.  He claimed the public’s sentiment was shifting away from the teachers.  For the previous 
ten years, parents tended to side with teachers in their contentions that City Hall treated 
government employees unfairly.  In 1952, blame for the Providence strike was split between the 
teachers and the school committee.  However, during this strike, Kelly argued, the fault rested 
entirely on the teachers because the public was left wondering “what teachers hope to gain by a 
strike that would offset the loss of wages, prestige, professional standing, and the respect of a 
large part of the community?”116  On the other hand, a Pawtucket family with four school-aged 
children was interviewed by The Providence Journal.  Both parents clearly regretted the delay in 
their children’s education, but they favored giving teachers the right to strike.  Alice Prescott 
observed, “if a person goes through college, it takes both time and money.  Most graduates get 
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$7,000 when they start work.  By comparison a $3,000 figure looked very small.”117  As a result, 
she understood the teacher’s willingness to strike for equitable benefits.  Harold Prescott 
concurred with his wife and added “they’ve got the right to strike.  I won’t deny that to 
anyone.”118
The Rhode Island judiciary entered a public sector labor dispute for the first time, as 
Judge Mullen of the Rhode Island Superior Court was brought in, but not in a judicial capacity,
to facilitate negotiations three days into the strike.  The entrance of the legal system marked a 
sharp departure from the past and demonstrated that the issue of the right to strike was now so 
controversial that problems could not be resolved in private meetings between teachers and city 
officials.  However, Mullen’s attempts to mediate the strike failed and the teachers were taken to 
court by the school committee.  The union president attacked this decision to call upon the power 
of the courts because “if a disheartened bunch of teachers are sent back to their classrooms by 
the order of the court, then education in Pawtucket will be a corpse.”119  He understood the 
ramifications that would follow if the teachers’ strike was halted by the court.  As one of the first
teachers’ strikes in the nation to be brought to court, many who witnessed the unfolding events 
felt “teachers throughout the country are watching the Pawtucket teachers’ struggle to emerge 
from being treated as third class citizens in a profession probably more important than any other 
for the future of our country.”120
With the eyes of the educational community on the Rhode Island courts, teachers were 
thoroughly disappointed with the trial judge’s ruling delivered on September 13, 1957.  Judge 
Frederick Frost declared the eight day strike illegal.  He drew a parallel to the Boston Police 
117
 Francesco Cantarella, “Family Regrets Teachers Strike,” The Providence Journal, 8 September 1957, p. 34.
118 Ibid.
119
 “First Attempt Made to Mediate Strike of Pawtucket Teachers,” The Providence Journal, 11 September 1957, p. 20.
120
 “Teachers,” The Providence Journal, 11 September 1957, p. 24.
52
Strike of 1919 where that public employee strike was crushed as a threat to public safety.  Frost 
claimed teachers’ strikes “embody a principle that is as potent now as then.”121  Government 
employees were explicitly prohibited by court order from striking in the state of Rhode Island 
because of the potential cost to the community at large.  Frost recognized that the damage caused 
by teachers was more subtle than the potential risks of a police strike; nonetheless, he felt that “to 
close the school is giving the children a push towards juvenile delinquency.”122  As a result, 
while he personally hoped the teachers’ demands would be met, he ruled the strike illegal.  
Although they returned to the classrooms, Pawtucket teachers continued to fight Frost’s ruling.  
Groups throughout the state called on the union to seek a state Supreme Court ruling which 
would officially define the legal rights of public school teachers.  On review by the state 
Supreme Court in 1958, the Superior Court’s ruling was affirmed.123  This legal opinion became 
a crucial element in Rhode Island labor law for it would set precedent for years to come.  
Several important trends in state public sector law emerged as a result of the Supreme 
Court ruling.  First, the unanimous opinion handed down by five justices of the court, in City of 
Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, demonstrated the power judges had in the field of 
labor law.  This case made it very clear that public sector workers were explicitly denied several
rights granted to Rhode Island private industry employees.  The first right denied to public 
employees was protection from injunctions.  According to Chapter 299 of the Rhode Island 
Constitution, injunctions cannot be used to end labor disputes.  The anti-injunction provision had 
been upheld in the private sector in the defining case of Lindsey Tavern, Inc. v. Hotel & 
Restaurant Employees, Local 307.124  Against the teachers, the Supreme Court affirmed the 
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injunction issued by the lower court denying public sector workers this fundamental protection.  
The explicit distinction made between private and public sector rights was clearly evinced when 
the Justice ruled that the anti-injunction rule would have held “true in the case at bar if 
respondents were not governmental employees performing a government function.”125
Another crucial right regarding the ability to stage picket lines came under fire in this 
teachers’ case.  Rhode Island had a law allowing peaceful picketing outside an establishment 
guaranteed to private sector employees by the case, Bomes v. Providence Local.126  Teachers 
were denied the right to picket outside their school.  The court again made it evident that 
government workers were treated differently for “if the instant dispute were one between the 
respondents and a private employer, there is no doubt that the activities of the respondents would 
be lawful.”127
Throughout the opinion in City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers’ Alliance, the court 
repeatedly asserted the notion of governmental sovereignty to justify their treatment of public 
sector workers.  Sovereignty provides the government with complete independence and freedom 
for external control by any other entity.  Unionization and strikes by workers threatened the 
state’s control over its employees which led many officials to oppose public sector strikes.  
Teachers were clearly agents of the state and exercised a portion of the state’s sovereign power 
for the Rhode Island Constitution stated, “the diffusion of knowledge through the use of the 
public school system so that the advantages and opportunities afforded by education will be 
made available to the people is the constitutional responsibility of the state.”128  Due to this 
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inclusion, a teachers’ strike against their employer was deemed as an attack on the operations of 
government.  
The opinion in the Pawtucket case provides a second key insight into the Justice’s 
feelings towards public sector unions.  In the section which declared government employee 
strikes illegal, no precedent was given.  This marks a sharp departure from usual judicial rulings 
which cite as much precedent as possible to reinforce the legitimacy of the decision.  Essentially, 
the court created law through this ruling.  This highlighted one of the fundamental problems in 
state and government public labor law.  Due to the fact that judges often invented the law, each 
state law emerged as a conglomeration of the individual judge’s personal opinion and local 
sentiments.  Judge-made law became the root of the ills of state and local public sector laborers.  
While the repeated strikes of public school teachers drew additional fire from the 
judiciary, the Rhode Island General Assembly came to realize that teachers needed a way to 
settle their disputes without launching a strike.  On May 19, 1965, the legislature approved 
Resolution Number 45, H1834 creating a “special commission to study the need for mediation 
and arbitration disputes involving school committees and certified school personnel in the public 
schools” 129  An eleven-member committee was appointed to study the relationship between 
school committees and the rights of teachers.  Senator Julius Michaelson, committee chairman, 
submitted a “Report on the Commission to Study Mediation and Arbitration” in February 1966.  
This report had two primary goals: to bring public employee rights closer into line with those in
the private sector and to guard the public interest from further disruptions in school operations.  
The report recommended legislation bearing a striking similarity to the National Labor Relations 
Act, but designed to fit the needs of public sector employees.
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The School Teachers’ Arbitration Act, locally known as the Michaelson Act, declared, it 
is 
“the public policy of this state to accord to certified public school teachers the right to 
organize, to be represented, to negotiate professionally, and to bargain on a collective 
basis with school committees covering hours, salary, working conditions, and other 
terms of professional employment; provided, that nothing contained in this chapter 
shall be construed to accord to certified public school teachers the right to strike.”130
Additionally, the act contained further language establishing arbitration as the preferred means of 
settling disputes in the school system.  
The passage of this piece of legislation cast Rhode Island into a group of just sixteen 
states to have “sophisticated updated Wagner/Taft Hartley type acts for public employees.”131
Granting local and state public employees the right to organize and engage in collective 
bargaining was a monumental step forward for organized labor much like the Wagner and Taft-
Hartley Acts had been for private sector laborers in previous years.  The Wagner Act had 
allowed private sector workers to unionize and the Taft-Hartley Act had reinforced this right.  By 
extending the right to unionize to school teachers, Rhode Island afforded their public sector 
workers a privilege found in relatively few other states.  The right to unionize conveyed a sense 
of legitimacy on local teachers’ unions which they had previously been denied.  Additionally, the 
right to collective bargaining was a huge step forward for state and local government workers 
because it offered them a means short of a strike to voice their discontent.  At the same time, 
denying teachers’ unions the right to strike further reinforced the fundamental difference 
between public and private sector labor.  This measure still did not end the teachers’ assertion 
that the right to strike belonged to all employees.  The vague language of the Michaelson Act 
stated only that the law did not give teachers the right to strike, but, at the same time, it did not
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strictly prohibit strikes.  In the coming years, this law would be interpreted by both local unions 
and the Rhode Island Supreme Court according to each side’s outlook on the right to strike.      
While this piece of legislation was in development, teachers continued to challenge the 
law.  The Pawtucket Teachers’ Alliance again went on strike stopping school for eight days in 
the fall of 1966.  The Superior Court, once again, issued an injunction ordering the teachers back 
to their classrooms.  This time the teachers refused and were held in contempt of court.  Teachers 
argued that they had a First Amendment right to strike.  The judge, citing a benchmark United 
States Supreme Court case, United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Company,132
stated, “this is not the sort of freedom of speech which is guaranteed and protected.”133  No 
substantial legal clarifications emerged from this case for it simply reaffirmed the 1958 ruling, 
but it clearly toughened the court’s negative attitude towards public employee strikes.  The court 
declared, for what it hoped to be the last time, “in this state the law is settled that a strike by 
public school teachers is illegal.”134  Following the court opinion, the teachers returned to their 
classrooms.  By 1966, the issue of teacher strikes in Rhode Island appeared to be settled; 
however, it would not be long before this issue was again brought before the court.
VI. “Public School Pedagogues:” Increasing Teacher Activism & the Rhode Island
Judiciary
The 1970s marked a period of increasing public sector activism.  Naturally, union 
membership in this sector quickly skyrocketed by 135.5 percent to over two million.135  In Rhode 
Island, teacher activism rapidly increased due to the changing power and position of teachers in 
society.  Throughout this decade, the number of students in schools declined leaving many 
schools overstaffed.  The surplus of teachers caused their salaries to drop and their level of 
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discontent to rise.  As a result, the number of strikes across the nation skyrocketed to one 
hundred and thirty a year during the 1970s.136  In September 1972, Rhode Island teachers began 
to make headlines for eleven teacher organizations were threatening to go out on strike if 
negotiations did not yield an acceptable compromise.  Rhode Island saw its first epidemic of 
militant teachers creating “a true crisis for the schools with the outcome now in the hands of the 
union membership.”137
Of the eleven threatened strikes, the actions and subsequent court case involving the 
teachers in the town of Westerly proved to be the most important.  Westerly teachers initiated 
their strike on September 5, 1972 maintaining the position of “no contract, no work.”  The 
teachers, like their predecessors, were brought before the Superior Court.  However in this 
instance, Judge Roberts lifted the retraining orders and allowed the strike to continue.  His 
actions indicated a possible shift in labor relations because he could have quite easily followed 
precedent and ruled the strike illegal.  Labor leaders throughout the state hailed “Judge Roberts’ 
move…as a possible landmark case that could carry broad implications particularly if the high 
court does rule that teachers have the same rights as other unions.”138
The Supreme Court, in a four to one ruling, did not concur with Judge Roberts.  His 
ruling was overturned on appeal in 1973.  A majority ruled that the “the need of preventing 
governmental paralysis justifies the ‘no strike’ distinction we have drawn between the public 
employee and his counterpart who works for the private sector within our labor force.”139  The 
ambiguity of the Michaelson Act also came under fire in this case for teachers were using the 
law to justify their strike.  Since the act did explicitly ban strikes, the teachers interpreted strikes 
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as still being a viable action.  The Court declared “if the Legislature wishes to give public school 
pedagogues the right to strike, it must say so in clear and unmistakable language.”140
The voice of public sector labor was not completely ignored in this case.  Chief Justice 
Roberts of the Rhode Island Supreme Court, in his dissent, went on record defending the right of 
teachers to strike.  First he believed the right to strike did not have to be conferred by legislation 
because, throughout history, the right to strike arose from years of struggle, not from a piece of 
legislation.  Any law which emerged simply protected the rights labor unions had earned.  
Roberts believed the right to strike was essential to survive in the modern industrial world.  As a 
result of this belief, the right to strike “must be subsumed in the right to organize and bargain 
collectively…for the collective bargaining process, if it does not include a constitutionally 
protected right to strike, would be little more than an exercise in sterile ritualism.”141
Furthermore, Chief Justice Roberts asserted the, at times, certain private sector strikes, such as 
those by hospital workers, threaten the safety and welfare of the community more than any 
teacher strike.  He mockingly mentioned that “it could be extremely difficult to conjure up such a 
threat to the public interest arising out of a strike of the employees of a recreation department of 
a municipality or of the clerical staff of a state agency.”142  He dismissed this argument as the 
catch all reason to ban public sector strikes.  Finally, he refuted the argument of government 
sovereignty for it was a piece of archaic tort law that should have been previously dismissed.  He 
did not believe a strike by teachers threatened the security and power of the state.      
The unique situation of state and local public sector laborers left them in a precarious 
position.  Federal employees, across the nation, were governed by one uniform code established 
by pieces of national legislation.  However, the treatment of state and local government 
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employees was determined by the state judiciary and legislature.  As a result, the location of a 
local government strike determined the course of action which would be taken.  In 1975, the 
AFL-CIO founded a Public Employee Department to push for the development of a national law 
because according to the leaders of the new department, “some states have good laws and good 
rights, but others are still living in the jungle, like we were back in the 1950s.”143  By the mid-
1970s Rhode Island had emerged from the jungle.  Even though state law still denied 
government workers the right to strike, laborers in Rhode Island had many more legal 
protections than the average public worker.  The legally protected right to unionize and bargain 
collectively protected unions from any arbitrary state actions.   
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CHAPTER 3:
A Wave of Teacher Militancy: An Up-Close Portrait of a 1975 Rhode Island Teachers’ Strike
 The Roberts’ Dictionary of Industrial Relations defines a strike as “a temporary work 
stoppage or concerted withdrawal from work by a group of employees of an establishment…to 
express a grievance or to enforce demands affecting wages, hours and/or working conditions.”144
This definition, so stark and clinical, strips a strike of its intrigue and excitement.  In a municipal
union strike, individual personalities, regional politics, and community opinions play an integral 
role in the development and character of a strike.  To understand the true nature of this 
phenomenon, an up-close examination of a local union strike is necessary.
I.  Testing the Limits:  Woonsocket Teachers, School Committee, & the Limits of 
Collective Bargaining
During the fall of 1975, Rhode Island became the state hardest hit by the growing wave 
of teacher militancy.  Strikes loomed in thirteen of the thirty-six school districts, including all the 
major cities in the state.  The current President of the American Federation of Teachers, Edward 
McElroy, who in 1975 served as the president of the Rhode Island Federation of Teachers, 
attributed this wide spread phenomenon to “an overall depressed national economy that resulted 
in budget cuts that became problematic.  As a result, aid to school districts was limited and these 
cuts made for serious problems.  In addition, in a number of communities there was a fledgling 
taxpayer revolt -- all of this made it difficult to reach a contract agreement.”145  Labor union 
lawyer, Richard Skolnik credited the wide spread strikes to the natural “competing interests 
between unions and school committees.  Many unions took the position that they wanted more 
and more, and I am not criticizing them.  It was salary.  It was fringe benefits and health 
insurance.  And obviously if a teachers’ union gets a benefit for its membership, it has to cost 
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somebody something, and it’s not the union.”146  Union teacher and former Vice-President, 
Richard DiPardo compared the overwhelming number of strikes to a “kid trying to test his limits 
in a growing relationship.”147  By 1975, Rhode Island teachers had possessed the right to 
collective bargaining for almost a decade and like any new process it took time for problems to 
arise.  Additionally, a majority of the thirteen districts with strikes looming were organized by 
the American Federation of Teachers which “always had a much more militant philosophy than 
the National Education Association which controlled other unions in the state.”148
The longest and most dramatic strike occurred in city of Woonsocket.  This small city has 
a long standing tradition of organized labor since its first textile mill opened in 1810 and, at the 
peak of the labor movement between 1933 and 1945, the city was home to approximately forty 
union locals.  The Woonsocket Teachers’ Guild emerged as one of the largest and most 
influential unions in this small city.  Founded in 1947, by a group of World War II veterans, the 
Guild replaced the ineffective Woonsocket Teachers’ Association.  According to Woonsocket, 
Rhode Island: A Centennial History, these veterans hoped to “play a positive role in the 
Woonsocket educational system and also secure salaries commensurate to their level of 
education.”149
Initial support for the newly formed union was not overwhelming.  Many teachers were 
hesitant to join a union and the city feared having to deal with a union.  However, eighty-one 
teachers became charter members of the union.  Additionally, the Guild immediately became 
affiliated with the American Federation of Teachers as Local 951.  In the union’s early years, the 
organization had very little power or influence because the laws of collective bargaining had not 
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yet been established.  Essentially, “Woonsocket teachers could only gain what the School 
Committee granted.”150  In a fashion similar to teachers’ unions across the country, the 1960s 
and 1970s were a period of radical change for the Teachers’ Guild.  Membership skyrocketed to 
over five hundred and the new young teachers “imbued with the new attitude and activism of the 
sixties…became articulate, vocal and eventually militant Guild members.”151  In 1966, the 
passage of the Michaelson Act gave the union the power of collective bargaining.  The following 
year the teachers signed their first written contract with the local School Committee which 
finally recognized the teachers as being equal to the School Committee in the negotiating 
process.
Relations between the School Committee and the Teachers’ Guild deteriorated in the 
summer of 1975.  According to former RIFT President, Edward McElroy, this problem was not 
unusual, but emerged from “the normal issues which separated the teachers from the school 
committee: salary, benefits, working conditions and the professional rights of teachers.”152
However, union Vice-President Richard DiPardo took a different stance.  He felt, “it had nothing 
to do with money, but rather it was our opinion that the School Committee was determined to 
cause a strike and provoke a union reaction.”153
A year earlier, the union had signed a two-year contract with the School Committee 
which included a provision allowing either side to reopen negotiations in regards to salaries and 
benefits in the second year.  Negotiation difficulties were common in the city for in 1974 it had 
taken nine months to develop this two-year contract.  During the summer of 1975, the teachers 
exercised their right to renegotiate salaries.  Quite simply, teachers’ salaries were not keeping 
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pace with the changing economy in this country.  For many years, the city had offered the second 
highest teachers’ wages in the state, but by 1975, the city ranked eleventh.  This decline in 
competitiveness is clear when one examines the rate of inflation sweeping the state during this 
period.  In 1974, the city provided only a 1.7 percent pay increase; whereas, Rhode Island had 
experienced an 11 percent inflation rate.154 During the initial negotiating sessions of 1975, the 
School Committee proposed only a 3 to 5 percent raise; whereas, the teachers called for a 6 to 10 
percent pay increase.155  A new teacher in 1974-1975 earned $8,450.  The School Committee 
proposed a raise to $8,500; whereas the union asked for $8,900.  Several newspaper articles 
would compare these proposals to the average wage upon which other communities had settled 
which was $8,597.156 The union also hoped to address medical insurance, sick leave, substitute 
teacher policy, child rearing leave, personal days, and the paraprofessionals’ contract.  The 
difference between these two parties appears relatively small in retrospect, but at the time, the 
union felt their members deserved this raise and that it was worth the intense debate.
By the end of August, the union and the School Committee were on their fourth proposed 
contract and fourth round of arbitration, yet none achieved the results both sides desired.  On 
August 23, 1975, the dispute was turned over to a mediator, Dr. William Robinson, Assistant 
Commissioner of the Rhode Island Department of Education.  After several months of standstill,
these talks brought both parties to the table, but the mediation produced no positive results.  
Guild President and spokesman, Thomas Flood, claimed the “the School Committee has zeroed 
in on one item; they don’t want to look at packages”157 for the city was focusing too much on the 
salary issue.  
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Two weeks into the strike, it is important to note that only minor concessions had been 
made by either side.  By September 12, 1975, the School Committee increased their proposed 
starting teachers’ salary to $8,575.  The money differences seem insignificant in retrospect and 
according to the union’s Vice-President, “short of getting every single thing we demanded, 
which was not going to happen- the union was going on strike.  It was not all about money.”158
In the end, it had to do with respect and fair treatment of the teachers by their employers.
II.  “No Contract, No Work:”  The Woonsocket Teachers’ Guild’s First Strike
As negotiations, arbitration, and mediation failed during the late summer of 1975, a strike 
began to emerge as a very real possibility.  By the end of August, union officers were instructing 
their members on the need for stronger actions.  The Woonsocket Teachers’ Guild News
announced, “the attitude of the school department looks like it will leave us only one option.  No 
contract- no work.  Strike.  We have never done it before; this may be the first time.”159  The 
local newspaper, The Woonsocket Call, often took a strong anti-union position.  Following 
mention of a strike, the newspaper reported, “perhaps the strong line taken by the union bulletin 
is an attempt either to bestir the membership into a more militant posture, or to pose a threat to 
city officials.”160
On August 29, 1975, in the basement of Saint Charles Church, the union membership 
convened to vote on whether or not to strike if no new contract was reached.  According to the 
union’s Vice-President, “the thought of failure never entered my mind.  There were no other 
contingency plans in place.  We had prepared our members, we were going to strike, and the vote 
was to make it official.”161  Intimidation was also employed by the union.  The leadership 
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strategically placed impassioned and loyal members around the hall to make statements in 
support of the strike and influence those around them into voting favorably.  Additionally, voting 
was not done by secret ballot, but rather in an open vote where all the members could see how 
their colleagues voted.  In the end, the measure passed by an overwhelming majority, for of the 
total 505 union members, almost 400 teachers were present at the meeting, and only 13 members 
dissented.  Explanations of the mass support differed from person to person.  President Flood 
stated he could not “have our teaching staff reduced to 450 zombies.”162  One teacher claimed, 
“it’s a question of professionalism…we can’t degrade ourselves…we must hold onto our 
points.”163
The decision of the Woonsocket public school teachers to strike was a difficult posture to defend.  
In Rhode Island, teachers’ strikes were illegal after the state Supreme Court had ruled against a 
teacher’s right to strike in the 1975 Westerly case.  Additionally, the teachers also appeared to be 
in violation of their own contract because Article 12 stated, “The Guild and its agents will not 
assist or participate in strikes.”164  The School Committee used these two legal documents to 
oppose the Guild’s threatened actions.  However, the Guild maintained a strict “no contract, no 
work” position.  Flood claimed that “when a portion of the contract is inoperative, the entire is 
destroyed.”165  As a result, the no- strike clause of their contract was not valid.  
On September 2, 1975, the School Committee made a preemptive attempt to sway public 
opinion by publishing a full page advertisement entitled, “An Open Letter To The Citizens Of
Woonsocket.”  Each and every line of the publication was an attack on the city’s teachers.  First,
the School Committee argued that the teachers were making unreasonable monetary demands
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Figure 3:  The Vote to Strike
Source:  The Woonsocket Call, 29 August 1975, p. 1.
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considering the city had one of the highest unemployment rates in the entire country.  The 
advertisement highlighted the five latest salary offers made by the School Committee, rejected 
by the teachers, and the increasing cost to the tax payers.  The letter accused the teachers of 
acting in bad faith, violating negotiating rules, constantly changing their demands, and stalling in 
order to put the “finishing touches on their strike signs.”166 (emphasis in original) The School 
Committee concluded that “such irresponsible, illegal acts by the Teachers’ Guild must be 
resisted.  Otherwise, lawlessness could become an expected way of life in Woonsocket.  
Eventually, this unfortunate, illegal strike will be resolved.  The sooner the better.  However, the 
Woonsocket School Committee is prepared to do everything in its power to protect the best 
interests of the children and taxpayers.”167  In the following day’s edition of The Woonsocket 
Call, union officers called the article “deceptive, misleading and outright wrong.”168
The teachers’ threat to strike became a reality on September 3, 1975.  The city’s entire 
teaching force “celebrated Labor Day by picketing the city’s school administration building 
twice.”169  At midnight on September 2, 1975, the exact moment the existing contract expired, 
eighteen teachers gathered for a small demonstration in front of the school department’s 
headquarters.  This “symbolic picketing”170 lasted for a mere thirty minutes, but it was just a 
precursor of what was to come.  At 7:30 am, the real strike commenced.  The School Committee 
insisted that all public schools would open on time.  Technically all nineteen schools did open; 
however, not one teacher reported to their classrooms.  Instead as the city’s 8800 school children 
arrived at every school, they found their teachers outside marching in picket lines.  School 
administrators were forced to send all students home within an hour of opening, and cancelled 
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school for the duration of the strike.  The insistence that all schools open angered union leaders.  
Union President Flood asserted, “the fact that the administration opened schools today is viewed 
by the Guild as a power play, and it never should have happened. It inconvenienced parents, 
students, and others.  They (administration and school board) wanted to see if they could break 
the strike.  It didn’t work.”171
The teachers’ actions were met with hostility, not only from the School Committee, but 
also from members of the community, parents, and students.  High school students were among 
the first critics of their teachers and a small group even formed their own picket lines to counter 
these actions.  While students admitted they had little knowledge of labor unions or their 
functions, several students denounced the strike because they believed the teachers “should be 
satisfied with what they get.  They are plain greedy.”172  Adults throughout the city also 
expressed outrage with the actions of the Guild.  The Woonsocket Call measured the city’s 
response to the strike by interviewing a random sample of community members.  Not one 
interview published in the paper expressed an ounce of support or understanding for the teachers.  
Instead, public resentment seemed to be the common reaction.  One man interviewed called for 
the firing of the entire teaching staff for he felt “with so many people out of work, teachers who 
are employed should be thankful.”173  Others appealed to the teachers’ sense of duty by claiming, 
“as educators you have been trusted with our children to build the future generations and the 
world expects you to meet that responsibility.  The educators of the past have sacrificed 
themselves for the betterment of you.  You owe it to them to keep with their good work and feel 
proud for your contribution to civilization.”174  While this was a rather lofty appeal, it raised an
171
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Figure 4:  Teachers on Strike
Source: The Woonsocket Call, 2 September 1975, p. 1.
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interesting question of whether teachers had the right to strike at the expense of their students’ 
education.  
The School Committee furthered the animosity towards the teachers by taking out 
another full page advertisement in the newspaper to publish the teachers’ current salaries and the 
proposed increases.  During a period where many Americans were out of work or barely above 
the poverty line, teachers appeared relatively well paid.  The local newspaper, on its own, also 
fostered hostility against the union for it often paired articles regarding the strike with reports 
from the Associated Press wires about the rapidly climbing unemployment rates across the 
country. Rhode Island Federation of Teachers Field Representative Robert Casey, an active 
participant in the 1975 strike, attributed the overwhelming negative reaction to one item, money.  
According to Casey, 
“Whether it was 1975 or 1995, most of the people in the state earn less than school 
teachers.  Most people in the state and around the country don’t belong to unions.  
Most people get resentful that they are not in the situation where they can bargain or
 exercise their economic power against their employer.  In most industrialized countries 
in the western world, we have the lowest participation in union membership. I think 
that’s in large part due to two things:  we don’t live in a country that promotes 
unionization and the average worker thinks they have more rights than they do, that 
they are protected by a variety of laws.  If you take a look at the average wage in Rhode 
Island…senior teachers are probably making twice the average wage.  Well, the 
average wage earner doesn’t have a masters degree to do their job and so…it’s how 
people value other people.”175
Public sector employees have never been embraced by the common man.  Flood
recognized this fact and announced that “the public has never supported municipal employees.  
They fight for pay increases in private industry but then view us as some type of indentured 
servant.  I would like to say right now that teachers are not public servants.  They are employed 
by the public but not as servants.  Neither is a fireman, policeman, garbageman or janitor a 
175
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servant.  They are employes (sic).”176 However, even in the face of all the opposition, the union 
continued the strike.  Teachers expressed the belief that they were fighting for a just cause and 
insisted “we’ll be out here until kingdom come if need be.”177
III. Unknown Legal Territory:  Woonsocket Teachers’ Guild & the Court
Five days into the strike, tension was building and the two parties were no closer to 
reaching a new agreement.  As a result, the School Committee began to petition the court for 
assistance through an injunction. An injunction is a common court order forcing a party to cease 
and desist with an action.  However, the injunction is a powerful tool for “the judge can thus, by 
court order, alter the balance of power and advantage between the parties and dramatically affect 
the outcome of the dispute.”178  In order for an injunction to be issued several requirements must 
be met.  First, the strike must cause irreparable harm.  Also, the group seeking the injunction 
must have clean hands and not have instigated the dispute in the beginning.  Another crucial 
element for injunctive relief is that no other legal remedy must exist which could end the dispute 
in a different manner.  Additionally, a “balancing of the equities” must exist.  This legal phrase 
mandates that the injunction cannot cause more harm than the action which is being stopped.  
Finally, there must be a realistic chance that the injunction can be enforced.179  While all of these 
factors are important to the injunctive process, the School Committee based their argument 
solely on the belief that the strike “was causing irreparable harm to the Woonsocket school 
children.”180
Teachers’ strikes in Rhode Island were governed by the legal precedent set by the 1973 
case School Committee of the Town of Westerly v. Westerly Teachers’ Association.  This case 
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mandated that a restraining order could not be issued without a hearing.  However, it did not 
specify what the hearing must entail.  Additionally, this ruling had gone untested between the 
1973 and the 1975 strikes.  As a result, the teachers of Woonsocket and a few other towns were 
venturing into unknown legal territory.  Their fate was placed in the hands of Judge John 
Bourcier.  The judge had publicly stated his disdain of the teachers’ strikes which were in 
progress across the state.  In a very colorful statement to The Woonsocket Call, the judge stated, 
“At 2p.m. Monday, somebody is going to have a bouquet of roses, and somebody is going to 
have a broken heart- and I think you all know who is going to have the bouquet and who is going 
to have the broken heart.”181  Beyond this one statement, Boucier’s previous rulings indicated his 
contempt for the teachers’ actions.  The teachers in the neighboring town of Cumberland had 
recently made their petition before Judge Boucier to justify the strike they were conducting in 
response to another contract dispute.  The judge stated, “if teachers engage in an illegal activity, 
a strike, I’ve got to step in.  I say nothing justifies the use of an illegal act.”182 In the 
Cumberland hearing, the judge stayed true to his convictions by issuing the injunction.  He also 
expressed his unfavorable opinion of the 1966 Michaelson Act which gave teachers the right to 
collective bargaining which, in the eyes of some, was the root of the epidemic of teachers’ 
strikes.  
Boucier’s hearings for Cumberland, Pawtucket, and Woonsocket unions were prejudicial 
against the teachers.  The judge allowed the teachers’ lawyers to make oral arguments and cross 
examine witnesses who testified regarding the “irreparable harm” of the students.  However, all 
rebuttals by the union were forbidden.  Additionally, the judge refused to accept the claim that 
the School Committee had bargained in bad faith.  With this limited testimony, Judge Boucier 
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issued the first restraining order against the Cumberland teachers.    Based on the same logic, he 
would issue a restraining order in Pawtucket.
The teachers of Woonsocket were given a very brief appearance in court.  Less than forty 
minutes into the Guild’s hearing on September 10, 1975, the judge issued a bench warrant ruling 
the WTG’s strike illegal and ordered the teachers back to their classrooms the following day.  A 
small glimmer of hope emerged the same day because, before the judge formally issued the 
injunction against the Woonsocket union, the Rhode Island Supreme Court finally interpreted the 
1973 Westerly case and formulated the definition of a hearing.  The Supreme Court overturned 
the judge’s earlier ruling in the Cumberland case on the grounds because he had “apparently 
failed to provide the defendant an effective opportunity to present relevant evidence.”183  This 
ruling vacated the restraining orders in Cumberland and Pawtucket and rescinded the bench 
order against the Woonsocket union.  Newspaper accounts describe the judge as “visibly 
shaken”184 by this action of the state’s premier court.  
Within a day, it became clear that the reversal of the bench order was only temporary.  
Judge Boucier was not to be deterred from his crusade to stop what he deemed an illegal action 
on the part of the Guild.  On September 11, 1975 the official injunction was issued.  It stated, 
“The defendant, Woonsocket Teachers' Guild, and each and every member thereof, is hereafter 
enjoined and prohibited from engaging in any work stoppage or strike in the City of Woonsocket 
school system from and after this day, September 11, 1975.”185  In his brief statement in open 
court, the judge focused on the damage being done to the students.  He noted the 
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“disillusionment of the first graders and the unfortunate position of seniors going out to look for 
jobs.”186
The story of the Woonsocket Teachers’ Guild strike would have remained in obscurity in 
Rhode Island labor law if it had ended after the initial injunction was issued.  However, for the 
union officers “to return to work in the face of an injunction is, in effect to abandon to purpose of 
the strike.”187  Therefore on September 12, the picket lines disappeared, but so did the teachers.  
The union officially claimed the strike was over and that they were not pressuring the teachers 
into remaining out of work.  Instead, it was asserted that all five hundred teachers were acting on 
their own beliefs.  On a later appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court would reject this argument 
on the basis of a principle established in the infamous labor case, United States v. International 
Union, United Mine Workers of America from 1948.  In this private sector labor case, the United 
States Supreme Court ruled, 
“as long as a union is functioning as a union it must be held responsible for the mass 
action of its members. It is perfectly obvious not only in objective reasoning but 
because of experience that men don't act collectively without leadership. The idea of 
suggesting that from 350,000 to 450,000 men would all get the same idea at once, 
independently of leadership…is of course simply ridiculous.188
Also on September 12, Judge Bourcier called for an “11th hour negotiating session.”189
While both sides agreed to meet, little was accomplished at the session.  Originally the two 
parties were arguing over a $450,000 difference.  By the second week of the strike, this figure 
had been whittled down to approximately $65,000 to $75,000.190  However, no middle ground 
was reached after a long negotiating session lasting from 9:30pm to 3:30am.  This prolonged 
split over a relatively small amount of money strengthened the Guild’s argument that the strike 
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“had to do with more than money.  It was about trust.  We didn’t trust them (the School 
Committee).  Also, the strike was based on the belief that the union simply had the human right 
to strike regardless of contractual language or law.”191
As a result of the teachers’ defiance, City Solicitor Richard Ackerman, on behalf of the 
School Committee, asked the court to issue contempt citations against all union officers.  When 
the union officers were brought back to court, the union president quickly and clearly 
annunciated his position.  He stated, “I have a deep and abiding belief in the collective 
bargaining process.  In deference to the court…I believe if I don’t have a contract, I cannot 
work.”192  Presiding Judge Weisberger of the Rhode Island Superior Court did not agree with the 
union’s plea.  On September 12, Judge Bourcier issued citations against eleven union officers 
forcing them to appear in court early the next morning to begin a new hearing where the officers 
would be required to “show cause why they should not be judged in contempt of an earlier 
citation.”193  As a result, six union officers, including the president, three vice-presidents, the 
secretary, and the treasurer, were found guilty of civil contempt and sent to Rhode Island’s Adult 
Correctional Institute on September 18, 1975.  Judge Joseph Weisberger dropped the contempt 
citations against the other five teachers because one held a paid position and the other four were 
only members of the executive committee and did not hold an elected position.  When asked to 
reflect upon this day in court, the union Vice-President remembered, “we knew walking into the 
courtroom we were going to get nailed.  There were state troopers stationed everywhere to 
intimidate us.”194
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These six teachers and members of the Pawtucket Teachers’ Alliance leadership (who 
were running a concurrent strike), would spend a total of seven days in jail for they repeatedly 
rejected the court’s offer to appear before a judge and end the contempt citations.  When looking 
back on these events, one incarcerated officer recalled, “it was completely unbelievable how 
uninformed we were for only Flood was involved in all aspects of negotiations.  We simply 
believed in what we were doing even though we didn’t know the details.”195  According to the 
prison’s public information officer, Lillian Daniel, the teachers took their stay in jail “with 
relative calmness.”196  However, the union members who were in jail remember the events 
differently.  According to the union’s Vice-President, “one guy cracked up, but for the rest of us 
it was an adventure.”197
Sending the union officers to jail also united the membership.  One jailed officer state d, 
“you hope that the membership was so angered with the jail sentences that they won’t bail on 
you.”198  The unionized teachers did not bail, but rather publicly showed their support for their 
colleagues as the “festering strike of Woonsocket school teachers blossomed into a candlelight 
demonstration at the City Hall Minipark.”199 According to the Guild’s lawyer, Richard Skolnik, 
sending people to jail served a purpose for it “really puts pressure on both sides.  You have 
mothers and fathers going to jail and they are separated from their family.  Then you have some 
very reasonable school committee members who don’t want to see teachers go to jail either, but 
they have to do something to make something happen.  And usually what happens…the parties 
soften their position and ultimately resolve problems.”200  Members of the union agreed that 
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sending the union officers to jail put a stop to the bickering and started a countdown as to who 
would break first. 
The pressure on both sides reached its breaking point twenty-four days into the strike. 
The Superior Court appointed Governor Phillip Noel as a binding arbitrator to end the strike.  
Field Representative Casey who was present at these proceedings recalled, “I can remember 
being at the State House,  in a conference room in the Senate chamber…I think he listened to just 
about a ten or fifteen minute presentation from each side upon their issues and he went out.  I 
think he was gone for about a half hour…That was it.  It was a way of getting both sides off the 
hook.”201 Noel presented both sides with a contract, and ordered them “to put aside and behind 
them all hostilities and frustrations.”202  Noel’s solution put forth 6.1 percent raise in salary and 
fringe benefits for the teachers.  This increased the base salary of teachers from $8,450 -
$13,600, in the 1974-1975 school year, to $8,650 - $14,550 for the 1975-1976 year.203   Noel’s 
solution appeared to be a compromise for both sides for it fell below the WTG’s demands, but 
forced the School Committee to agree to a figure higher than their original proposal.  Ironically,
after this prolonged strike, binding arbitration left the teachers with a base salary extremely close 
to the original summertime proposal of the School Committee.  This relatively disappointing end 
for the teachers leaves one wondering if teachers’ strikes are worth all of the disruption caused to 
their communities.  To many teachers, the strike did serve a purpose and were a good way by 
which to achieve change. Vice-President Richard DiPardo recalled, “we didn’t get what we 
wanted, but neither did they (the School Committee)…but it did lead to a period of peace in 
future negotiations.”204
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While the governor officially ended Rhode Island’s longest teachers’ strike, the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court would eventually weigh in on the dispute on October 8, 1976.  In the case, 
Albert Menard v. Woonsocket Teachers’ Guild-AFT 951, the Court upheld the injunction issued 
by the lower court because the strike caused “the Woonsocket public school children irreparable 
harm” by interfering with the “students’ learning process; the failure to provide free school 
lunches for needy children; and the disadvantage seniors might experience from an untimely 
entry into the job market caused by a late school closing.”205
The 1975 Woonsocket Teachers’ Guild strike ran concurrently with another identical 
strike in the city of Pawtucket.  The Pawtucket Teachers’ Alliance had the same injunction 
issued against it and, subsequently, the city’s union officers were jailed along with the 
Woonsocket teachers.  However, an interesting difference appeared on review by the state 
Supreme Court.  Justice Kelleher, who ruled with the majority in the Woonsocket case, reversed 
his position in the following months.  In the Pawtucket case, The School Committee of the City 
of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers’ Alliance, Local No. 930, he entered a dissenting opinion 
which urged a more careful handling of these confrontations between school boards and public 
school teachers.  Kelleher wrote, “I am fully aware that work stoppages of public employees lead 
to litigation which is usually conducted in a pressure-packed atmosphere…The rush and the 
anxiety to do something to get the public employees back on the job is understandable, but I trust 
that we all may profit from what has transpired during the past year as governmental agencies 
have come to the courthouse to resolve a collective bargaining impasse.”206  Additionally, 
Kelleher expressed his inability to support the contempt citations issued against the teachers 
because 
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“As I read the terms of the injunction, it orders the union to end the strike and 
nowhere does it direct the union officers to exhort the rank and file to return to the
classrooms…it is my ineluctable conclusion that those who were incarcerated were 
imprisoned solely because of their failure to speak to the union membership and 
advocate a return to the classrooms…The contempt judgment contains a finding that
 the present controversy falls well within the holding of United States v. United Mine 
Workers of America. A cursory look at the order entered in that particular case shows 
that it was far more explicit and detailed than the preliminary injunction that was
entered in the Superior Court.  A court order should be obeyed. Obedience, however,
 cannot be demanded of something that is not specifically set forth in the order.”207
These divergent opinions in the Rhode Island judiciary have characterized Rhode Island’s 
attempt to balance its tradition of being a progressive labor state with the national trend to 
prohibit public sector labor strikes.  
IV.  Emergence of a True Union:  Results & Consequences of the 1975 Strike
The 1975 wave of teacher militancy which swept through Rhode Island highlights the 
importance of the right to strike.  The Woonsocket Teachers’ Guild strike played a crucial role 
on the local level for while “the strike led to community outrage, anger, and frustration…it made 
the Guild a true union.  When forced to, the Guild used its basic weapon, the strike.”208  Also, as 
one union officer put it, “strikes have to happen from time to time to shake up the system.”  A 
shakeup certainly did occur following this strike.  The union was “forced to mobilize politically.  
While the newspaper articles bashed the teachers during the strike, our efforts killed the careers 
of the School Committee leadership in the following election.”209  In the elections of 1976, both 
the Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the School Committee were voted out of office.  Also, in 
the months following the strike, the Guild began to call for a symposium with the union, the 
School Committee, and the city’s Chamber of Commerce on collective bargaining in the public 
sector and areas of the process which could be improved.  
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In the aftermath of 1975’s wave of teacher strikes, legal attempts were made to prevent 
future teachers’ strikes.  A law proposed by Woonsocket’s School Committee called for a ten 
day limit on teachers’ strikes.  After the ten days had passed, all teachers would be required to 
return to work, be governed by the previous contract, and enter in binding arbitration with the 
city.  The proposed law also included fines:  one day’s pay for each of the first ten days and two 
days’ pay for every day that followed.  Members of the School Committee argued, “the days lost 
to a teachers’ strike cannot be ‘made up’ because of the demoralizing effect such days have on 
students, their parents and even the teachers themselves.”210  No such law was ever passed in 
Rhode Island.  The Teachers’ Guild, during the contract negotiations for the 1976-1977 contract 
would attempt to delete the no-strike clause.  This, too, was an endeavor in futility.211
Additionally, this local strike hit at the heart of a larger debate over whether public 
employees should have the right to strike at all.  These events demonstrated that strikes are never 
the first course of action pursued.  Public employees are not “strike-happy”212 contrary to their 
portrayal in the media and, often, by the judicial branches.  The strike is a union’s weapon of last 
resort which is used only when all other attempts to end labor disputes have been exhausted.  The 
right to strike debate began long before the Woonsocket Teachers Guild’s first strike and 
continues decades after this municipal strike ended.  Today, Rhode Island public employees, 
especially teachers, continue the battle for the right to strike.
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CHAPTER 4: 
The Future of Rhode Island Unions and the Right to Strike
While the 1970s marked the heyday of teacher activism, Rhode Island teachers’ unions 
have by no means lain dormant for the past twenty-five years.  Instead, between 1980 and 2005 
there has been a considerable expansion of union membership and its lobbying power.  At the 
same time, the Rhode Island General Assembly, judiciary, and press have not relented from their 
attempts to rein in the power of not only teachers’ unions, but of all public sector labor unions 
within the state.  This struggle for power between the state’s public sector unions and the 
government has shaped the face of Rhode Island today.
I.  A Lackluster Endeavor:  Woonsocket’s Last Teachers’ Strike:
Less than five years after the 1975 strike by the Woonsocket Teachers’ Guild, the city’s 
teachers would once again find themselves in a precarious and virtually identical position.  The 
contract between the union and the city was due to expire on August 31, 1980.  Negotiations had 
begun extremely early, in February 1980, in hopes to avoid a conflict and possible strike in the 
summer.  However, it would soon become evident that there was no clear resolution in sight.  
Both the union and the School Committee were firmly entrenched with their contract 
proposals.  The union initially asked for a 9 percent raise with added pay supplements governed 
by the state’s cost of living.  The School Committee, on the other hand, proposed only a 2.8 
percent raise for the teachers.213  However, the city’s proposal denied this raise to all teachers 
who were currently paid on the top step of the salary scale.  This was extremely problematic for, 
like most teaching staffs, a majority of Woonsocket’s teachers had been hired in the early 1970s 
during the education boom.  As a result, of the city’s 450 teachers, over 300 had enough seniority 
to be paid on the top salary scale.  Another obstacle in the negotiations dealt with a proposal to 
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increase the amount of planning time given to elementary school teachers.  The union proposed 
adding forty-five minutes of unassigned time to each of the city’s elementary teachers.  The 
union deemed this time necessary for the teachers to prepare for classes and, also, to give the 
students added time for gym and art courses.  The city flat out refused this proposal.  A study 
conducted by the School Committee indicated that to grant these unassigned periods would 
require the hiring of twenty new teachers at a cost to the taxpayers of $175,000 to $250,000.214
A second contract proposal emerged from the School Committee on August 15, 1980.  
This new contract proposal which included a 6 percent raise to all teachers, but only a 
commission composed of Guild and School Committee members to study the unassigned 
periods.215  Other items were thrown into the negotiations during the summer of 1980.  For 
example, the School Committee wanted to deny all teachers the right to leave their school 
buildings on errands during their break periods.  Also, the Guild was asking for increased 
compensation for vocational school teachers based on their amount of practical work experience.  
By the end of the summer the union had dropped their demand for cost of living pay, but 
increased their proposed raise to 12 percent.  While the topics of negotiation are reminiscent of
the 1975 strike, members of the union, School Committee, and press observed one notable 
difference.  Union president George Lacouture commented, the union “is pleased negotiations 
have been done in a ‘calm atmosphere’ without ‘the shouting’ that once prevailed in the past.”216
Nine days before the slated opening of the city’s schools, whisperings of another strike 
began to appear.  The union officers again espoused the principle of “no contract, no work.”  
With the 1975 strike still fresh in the minds of the community, the threat of another strike put 
added pressures on all parties involved.  On August 27, 1980, the Rhode Island Department of 
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Education stepped in to mediate the dispute.  Under the guidance of Donald Driscoll, contract 
talks were scheduled for 1:30 to 5:30 pm and, also, 10:30pm to 4:30am.  According to Driscoll, 
“if time is the answer, we’re putting in the hours.”217  However, time was not the answer.  
Teachers’ orientation day was slated for September 2, but on that day pickets, not teachers, 
emerged outside of every school. 
As the school bells rang on September 3, 1980, the city’s teachers once again choose to 
strike instead of return to the classroom.  During this strike meeting opposition was virtually 
absent for only 2 or 3 teachers out of the entire membership voiced a “no” vote.  Lacouture, the 
union’s president, expressed his disbelief explaining, “the union has thus far shown ‘more 
solidarity than anything else,” and admitted to being “kind of shocked’ that not much objection 
was shown by members to the work stoppage.”218  It is an interesting point of fact that 
Woonsocket was again not the only Rhode Island school district on strike, but was joined by 
Cumberland and Westerly in the fall of 1980.  
The public’s reaction to yet another teacher’s strike was not entirely negative.  City 
Councilman Francis Lanctot, who would later become mayor, emerged as a vocal opponent of 
the strike, but placed the blame entirely on the School Committee, not the teachers.  In a harsh 
statement to The Providence Journal, Lanctot remarked, “the School Committee insulted people 
by pretending it was negotiating since January.  This is the same game that is played every year.  
The committee could best serve the community by resigning.”219  Beyond just criticizing the 
School Committee, Lanctot expressed a level of sympathy with the teachers asserting, “I don’t 
blame the school teachers for fighting for more money because that is what unions are for.”220
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Regular citizens expressed certain levels of disgust with the teachers’ actions.  One area resident, 
interviewed by The Woonsocket Call, stated, “Every year they think they can keep pushing for 
more and more just because they have a union.  They don’t work that much and I don’t think 
they deserve it.”221 This sentiment bears a striking similarity to interviews conducted in 1975. 
Negotiation is often a long and drawn out process which, for the teachers in 1980, would 
last for nine more days.  On September 3, slight progress was made as the city increased their 
salary proposal to 8 percent and the union decreased their demand to 10 percent.222  Although 
this third proposal brought the parties extremely close together, the negotiations would stagnate 
for the next four days.  This breakdown in negotiations left the newspapers with little activity to 
cover; as a result, the local newspaper simply ran articles recapping the past days’ events.  It is 
important to note that even several days into the strike, newspaper reporters were commenting 
that “it thus far lacks the bitterness that was immediately evident in the teachers’ strike of 
1975.”223
The Woonsocket Teachers’ Guild co-opted a tactic employed by the city in the strike five 
years earlier.  On September 6, the Guild purchased a large advertisement in The Woonsocket 
Call, announcing “the Woonsocket Teachers’ Guild regrets that a body of professionals must be 
forced to withhold its services.  Important as these services are, it is equally important that we be 
treated as fairly as other professional groups in this city and in this state.”224  Nine days into the 
strike a tentative agreement was reached which provided the union with a 7.5 percent pay 
increase.  When applied to a teacher’s starting salary it raised wages from $10,250 to $10,866.  
Additionally, the compromise provided elementary teachers with an additional thirty minutes of 
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planning time.  Reaction by teachers was not enthusiastic, prompting some to exclaim, “We got 
the shaft.”225 With 450 of 460 members present at the meeting to ratify the contract, only 15 to 
20 vocalized their opposition to the new contract.226  This lackluster meeting brought an end to 
Woonsocket’s last teachers’ strike.  It seemed a new era in teacher-school committee relations 
had dawned for the two parties were able to settle their disagreements without involving the 
court or a need to send participants to jail.  
II. “A Rite of September:”  Finding the Root of Rhode Island Teacher Strikes
Throughout the nation, but particularly in Rhode Island, teachers’ strikes have become 
“as much a rite of September as the reopening of schools.”227  Although the city of Woonsocket 
has not engaged in a strike in the last twenty-five years, it cannot be viewed as representative of 
the state’s educational system.  Since 1980, six additional cases dealing with teachers’ strikes 
have been adjudicated by the Rhode Island Judiciary:  Coventry School Committee v. Coventry 
Teachers’ Alliance and Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board,228 Exeter-West Greenwich 
Regional School District v. Exeter-West Greenwich Teachers’ Association,229 School Committee 
of the City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers Alliance, Local No. 930,230 Warwick School 
Committee v. Warwick Teachers’ Union, Local 915,231 Warwick Teachers’ Union Local No. 
915, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Warwick School Committee,232 Warwick School Committee v. Warwick 
Teachers’ Union.233  With the exception of the Coventry case, all decisions ruled against the 
teachers’ unions, their strikes, and appeals brought before the court.  
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As Justice Kelleher of the Rhode Island Supreme Court accurately stated in his opinion in 
the 1986 Pawtucket ruling, “Most Rhode Islanders have become accustomed to the likelihood 
that when the summer season comes to an end with the setting of the sun on Labor Day, a strike 
by the public school teachers in one of the state's municipalities or school districts will take place 
when the ringing of the school bells announces the opening of another school year.”234 These six 
cases barely scratch the surface of the issue in teachers’ strikes in Rhode Island.  For every case 
which reached the court system, dozens were settled without the involvement of the judiciary.  
Between 1985 and 2005, The Providence Journal published over five hundred articles 
addressing the issue of teachers’ strikes.  This extensive coverage begins to indicate how 
widespread the phenomena of teacher work stoppages are in the nation’s smallest state.
Rhode Island stands apart from any other state in the country in regard to the number and 
frequency of teachers’ strikes.  The press often observes that “the scene is so common in Rhode 
Island that we forget how rare it is across the United States. Just next door, in Connecticut, entire 
generations of children have never seen their teachers on the picket line.”235  A few statistics 
clearly illustrate this phenomenon.  For example, in 1991 there five strikes in New England and 
all five were taking place in Rhode Island.  Four years later, in 1995, seven teachers’ strikes 
occurred in the Unites States of which two were in Rhode Island.236 A Providence Journal 
reporter once posed an amusing question by asking, “What's going on here? Has the state 
spawned a new criminal class, composed of the very people charged with nurturing the minds of 
our youth?”237 While he was not being entirely serious, he was probing the reasons behind this 
unique Rhode Island phenomenon.  In essence, there is no one cause, but rather several factors 
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have made Rhode Island the leader among the states in teachers’ strikes including, the structure
of the state’s school districts, the wording of the Michaelson Act, a deadlocked legislature, and 
“statewide politics with a small-town flavor.”238
The manner in which Rhode Island school districts receive funding emerges as the first 
structural problem.  In New England, school committees depend solely on the mayor and city 
government to provide necessary funds; in contrast, in the Mid-West, school districts operate as 
complete and independent government bodies with an elected leadership and the ability to levy 
taxes.  Due to this structure, it is much simpler for school districts in the Mid-West to raise the 
money necessary to provide teachers’ with raises.239  On the other hand, the New England 
structure pits educational issues and funding at odds with other city and local decisions.  
Whatever money is directed to education is taken away from other citywide improvements and 
programs, which often leads school districts to get less funding than they require and makes it 
difficult to increase teachers’ salaries.  In 2003, Rhode Island ranked forty-seventh in the nation 
for the amount of funding given to education by the state government.  Massachusetts ranked 
seventeenth and Connecticut ranked twenty-second. 240  The same year, Rhode Island ranked 
thirty-eighth in money received from local governments.  In comparison, Massachusetts ranked 
ninth and Connecticut ranked sixteenth.241  According to AFT spokesman, Jim Horwitz, New 
England school districts are “just an awkward structure. There's a whole extra step there where 
things can break down, and get politicized. Result? More strikes.”242
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The small structure of Rhode Island school districts creates another reason for dispute.  
As the nation’s smallest state, Rhode Island boasts only 36 school districts, 158,592 students, and 
12,039 teachers.243  By comparison, the neighboring state of Massachusetts boasts 372 districts, 
983,313 students, and 73,404 teachers.244 The high frequency of strikes, in combination with the 
low number of school districts in Rhode Island, indicates that the individual Rhode Island 
teacher engages in strikes more frequently and has an impact on more students than in any other 
state.  
This problem has not gone unnoticed, but rather several proposals to unite the Rhode 
Island school districts into larger more cohesive units have appeared throughout the last decade.
A prominent advocate of this type of measure is Julie Steiny, a former member of the Providence 
School Committee, current author of the reoccurring Ed Watch, Issues, & Ideas column in The 
Providence Journal, and critic of Rhode Island teachers’ unions.  She sees school district 
organization as the root of teachers’ strikes and proposed a three part plan to prevent future 
strikes and remove the “contractual monkeys”245 from Rhode Island’s educational system.  Her 
plan calls for negotiation of a statewide benefits plan, creation a standardized salary scale for the 
state, and moving the expiration of teachers’ contracts from August 31 to June 30.  The first two 
prongs of Steiny’s plan are based on the assumption that “every time insurers dream up a new 
perk, unions put it on the table and boom, they're off and running. If one district has the perk, a 
lower co-pay or spouse coverage for life, we enter the Rhode Island sibling world of ‘you love 
her more than you love me.’ And the squabble begins.”246  By making a unified state contract, 
there would be no more envy between the school districts.  The third prong makes logical sense.  
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By moving up the contract expiration date, school committees and teachers would have more 
time to work out their differences and not be forced to cram negotiation sessions into the last 
week of the summer vacation.  Some communities have taken similar actions to that which the 
Steiny proposed.  For example, the city of Woonsocket would change the expiration date of 
teachers’ contracts from August 30th to June 30th in the 1990s.  The whole of Steiny’s plan 
received little attention from anyone in power; however, it did not stop her attacks on the 
teachers of Rhode Island.  In 2001, her column highlighted the fact that “if Rhode Island is ever 
to do away with the annual teachers strikes, we will have to dismantle the mechanical, legalistic 
systems that prevent communities from cultivating their own schools.”247
In June 2003, Representative Nicholas Gorham, a Republican from the town of Coventry, 
offered a plan for a statewide teachers’ contract.248  He proposed a commission to study both the 
positive and negative aspects of this drastic change to Rhode Island’s education system.  
However, there are some thorny issues to this proposal.  For example, if a contract could not be 
reached, as is often the case in Rhode Island, the entire state’s teaching force could go out on 
strike.  Additionally, Rhode Island teachers’ unions are affiliated with both the American 
Federation of Teachers and the National Education Association.  Deciding which union would 
negotiate a statewide contract would be extremely problematic.  Both unions remain skeptical 
about this plan.  
Representative Paul Crowley, a Democrat from Newport, has devoted his political career 
to educational reform and, as a result, much of the proposed legislation to revamp Rhode Island 
law has been initiated by this local politician.  In 2003, Crowley put forth a plan for two state 
wide teachers’ contracts, one for the NEA locals and one for the AFT locals.  This bill asked for 
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the 2004 state budget to include a provision to perform a cost-benefit analysis of this proposal.  
Public hearings would be slated to occur throughout the state during the 2005-2006 school year.  
Then in the 2006 general elections, residents of all communities would be ask to vote for either 
the statewide contract or maintaining the local contracts.  If approved, the new version of 
teachers’ contracts would go into effect in 2007.249  Two years later, the possibility of a statewide 
contract still remains in the preliminary discussion phase.
Not all blame for the vast number of teachers’ strikes can fall on the organization and 
structure of Rhode Island’s school districts.  Public sector employees, since the start of their 
struggle for rights, have faced opposition by the law.  The current labor situation in Rhode Island 
has led many scholars, press, politicians, and education professionals to fault Rhode Island law 
as the root of a majority of the strikes in the state.  
There are essentially three basic types of laws nationwide governing teacher contract 
impasses.  Some states mandate binding arbitration, others grant teachers the right to strike, but
many are “like Rhode Island - neither fish nor fowl…There’s no right to strike, but there’s not 
another mechanism to resolve the dispute, either.”250  In Rhode Island, teachers’ strikes are
illegal according to the 1973 Westerly case, but not criminal.  There is no penalty for many 
Rhode Island teachers who initiate and participate in a strike.  The state law mandates that 
schools operate for 180 days.  Any time lost to a strike is simply made up at the end of the year 
which means teachers do not lose any money by engaging in a strike.  With nothing to lose and 
everything to gain, it is no wonder Rhode Island teachers are so willing to strike.  
The Michaelson Act, the backbone of Rhode Island collective bargaining law, was a huge 
improvement for public school teachers when developed in 1966.  However, problems began to 
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emerge as the law was put into practice.  Unlike the collective bargaining laws regulating Rhode 
Island police and firefighters, the Michaelson Act does not provide binding arbitration in 
economic issues.  Binding arbitration is only valid on work issues such as classroom size.  As a 
result, there is no incentive for teachers’ unions to submit to this process. Additionally, the vague 
wording of the act which stated, “nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to accord 
to certified public school teachers the right to strike”251 allowed teachers’ organizations to claim 
while the act does not condone strikes, it does not expressly prohibit strikes either.  The act’s 
author, former Senator Julius Michaelson, once reflected, “The idea was that if the law required 
school committees and teachers to sit down together and negotiate and try to resolve their 
differences, you wouldn't have strikes.  The hope was that these talks would sort of lead to a kind 
of a partnership in education, where both sides have the same goals and in a reasonable way 
could work things out. And in the early years, it worked very well.”252
Rhode Island law is seen as the source of problems because other nearby states have 
adopted much more stringent laws governing a teacher’s ability to use their most powerful 
weapon.  As a result of harsh laws, states such as Massachusetts, New York, and Connecticut 
have witnessed a drastic reduction in the number of strikes which delay the opening of school 
each year.  
Massachusetts law expressly states, “No public employee or employee organization shall 
engage in a strike, and no public employee or employee organization shall induce, encourage or 
condone any strike, work stoppage, slowdown or withholding of services by such public 
employees.”253  This unequivocal language prevents unions from employing it in their defense as 
Rhode Island teachers have done with the Michaelson Act’s vague wording.  Additionally, 
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Massachusetts law has a punitive power by stating that when, “an employee organization 
willfully disobeys a lawful order of enforcement pursuant to this section, or willfully encourages 
or offers resistance to such order, whether by strike or otherwise, the punishment for each day 
that such contempt continues may be a fine for each day to be determined at the discretion of 
said court.”254
While Massachusetts law allows a union to be financially penalized, the New York 
legislature passed an even harsher law known as the Taylor Law or, officially, as the Public 
Employee’ Fair Employment Act of 1967.  This act punishes the individual teacher: “No public 
employee or employee organization shall engage in a strike, and no public employee or 
employee organization shall cause, instigate, encourage, or condone a strike…The chief fiscal 
officer of the government involved shall deduct from the compensation of each such public 
employee an amount equal to twice his daily rate of pay for each day or part thereof that it was 
determined that he had violated”255 the law.  
The Connecticut legislature established the Teacher Negotiation Act in 1969.  In a 
fashion similar to Massachusetts and New York, the Teacher Negotiation Act states, “No 
certified professional employee shall, in an effort to effect a settlement of any disagreement with 
the employing board of education, engage in any strike or concerted refusal to render 
services.”256  This state took its act even further to not only ban strikes, but also mandated 
binding arbitration for contract impasses.  This clause asks each side to prepare a final contract 
offer which is presented to a three person arbitration panel composed of one union chosen 
arbitrator, one city chosen arbitrator, and one neutral party.  The panel then examines the 
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proposals and on every contentious issue chooses one party’s proposal.  In the end, a contract 
emerges which is combination of both final proposals.  
While other states have taken a firm and clear stance regarding a teachers’ right to strike, 
one must wonder why Rhode Island has maintained its ambiguous Michaelson Act for the last 
forty years.  This legal stagnation has not occurred due to a lack of effort.  Legal reform in 
Rhode Island is popular among state politicians and “as regular as poppies in the late spring”257
the General Assembly annually hears proposals to overhaul or replace the Michaelson Act. 
Representative Crowley proposed a reinterpretation of Rhode Island case law in the 
1990s.  While the Michaelson Act makes no mention of “irreparable harm” to students, the 
Rhode Island Judiciary, over the years, has made it necessary for school districts to prove that the 
teachers’ strike actually harms the students before an injunction can be issued.  Crowley in 1995, 
1996, and 1997 proposed a bill which would remove the “irreparable harm” clause and make it 
easier and faster for courts to issue injunctions in teachers’ strikes.  Representative Crowley 
believes the Michaelson Act already “assumes a strike is a very bad thing for education and is 
not in the public’s interest, and judges shouldn’t be holding hearings to determine harm.”258
Unfortunately for Crowley, both the Rhode Island Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO and the 
National Education Association/Rhode Island came out in opposition to his bill.  RIFT President 
Marcia Reback stated, it’s “an interesting piece of legislation, actually, in terms of the practical 
effect on bargaining, and the use of the courts as a weapon against teachers…I think it does 
nothing to further getting a settlement but simply tilts all the pressure against teachers.”259
NEA/RI President Harvey Press told The Providence Journal that “The issue is there's a strike, 
whether one day or six days, before the court can issue an injunction. If you force teachers back 
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without a contract, we've found that's even more detrimental than a five-day strike.”260 In 1996, 
Crowley’s bill was actually approved by the House Judiciary Committee, but it did not get a vote 
on the floor.
The Rhode Island Legislature frequently calls for or is presented with legislation 
proposing binding arbitration for educational contract disputes.  This type of legislation first 
appeared in the months following the Woonsocket teachers’ strike of 1975.  In 1976, the 
Manning Commission, a group headed by a local state representative, proposed a new manner in 
which to end strikes, last-best offer arbitration.  Under the House’s proposal, an arbitrator would 
be appointed early in the strike and would have to choose between the final demand of the union, 
the final offer of the School Committee, or the recommendation of an independent fact finder.  
The House’s proposal would also officially outlaw teachers’ strikes and allow the enforcement of 
an arbitrator’s decision.  At the same time, the Rhode Island Senate proposed and passed its own 
conflicting legislation.  The Senate bill allowed teachers to strike and called only for regular 
binding arbitration.261  Little came from these legislative debates as neither proposal gained 
support in both branches of the legislature.  Ironically, the same proposals made in 1975 still 
appear before the General Assembly allowing politicians to believe that eventually a proposal 
will be approved.
In recent years, the National Education Association has become the foremost proponent 
of this type of legislation.  Since its founding, the NEA has been an advocate for peaceful 
resolution of teacher disputes and, therefore, binding arbitration appears to be a reasonable 
solution to contract disputes.  In 1997, the NEA/RI and Representative Gordon D. Fox, a 
Democrat from Providence, emerged as two different sponsors of binding arbitration laws, 
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similar to Connecticut.  Also known as the last-best offer legislation, the NEA bill would require 
both sides to submit their final proposal ten days before the end of the current contract to an 
outside arbitrator.  Fox’s bill would require the same steps to be taken before the end of the last 
school year governed under the contract.  The additional time would prevent fall school 
disruptions.  The NEA, with the assistance of a Washington, DC research agency, conducted a 
survey of Rhode Island residents which indicated that 73 percent favored the last-best offer 
legislation, 19 percent opposed, and 9 percent were undecided.262 The Rhode Island Federation 
of Teachers, the Rhode Island League of Cities and Towns, and the Rhode Island Association of 
School Committees steadfastly oppose binding arbitration.  According to RIFT President 
Reback, “It’s a bill which places all of the responsibility for coming to an agreement on the 
teachers. It places no responsibility on a school committee to come to a fair contract. It’s 
punitive.”263  The other two organizations oppose the bill due to the dramatic increase in cost 
which binding arbitration causes in education.  This trend has become clear in Connecticut for 
“while there may be greater harmony with unions, there’s an increasing backlash in 
communities. We see taxpayers voting down the local budgets, saying teacher salaries are too 
high. But the contract is in place. There may be fewer teachers as a result, and larger class sizes. 
But the salaries won’t be cut.”264  The binding arbitration law was put forth again in 2001 by 
Representative Robert D. Sullivan, but was defeated.
A multitude of other bills have appeared before the Rhode Island General Assembly in 
the last twenty years.  A bill, similar to the law in New York, has appeared twice in 1993 and 
1997.  In 1993, Representative Donald Large, a Democrat from Cumberland, proposed a fine 
equal to two days pay for every day teachers were on strike.  Four years later, Senator Roger R. 
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Badeau of Woonsocket put forth a virtually identical bill upon the urging of the state’s School 
Committee Association.  While Badeau sponsored the bill, he also saw the futility of proposing 
this legislation and comically remarked, “You couldn't pass that if you were President 
Lincoln.”265
Representative Marc C. Lauzon of Woonsocket proposed not only a monetary fine, but 
also a change in the Michaelson law to make strikes explicitly illegal.  Monetary fines again 
appeared in the proposal of Senator Edward Lawrence of Warwick.  However, Lawrence desired 
to make teachers’ strikes legal.  He then called for the Superior Court to assess which party was 
responsible for the strike.  If the union was responsible a two day pay fine would be imposed on 
all members, but if the school committee was found at fault each member would be charged
$200.266
In the mid-1990s, Rhode Island legislators would branch out and propose strike laws 
unlike those in any other state in the country.  In 1993, an extremely unusual bill known as “back 
to the future” legislation was put forth by Democratic Senator Joseph McGair of Warwick.  This 
bill, S797, stated that if by April 1st of the last year of a teachers’ contract a new resolution had 
not yet been devised the contract disputes would be turned over to and decided by a twelve 
member Superior Court jury.  This bill never made it out of the legislature.
Former Governor Bruce Sundlun also involved himself in this debate as his office put 
forth the “Quinlan Bill.”267 Robert H. Quinlan was the chairman of the Warwick School 
Committee in the early 1990s with whom Governor Sundlun had gotten into a disagreement.  
This bill incorporated several novel and unprecedented clauses.  For example, Sundlun’s bill 
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called for the establishment of a fact finding committee, allowed a mediator to establish a one to 
three month cooling off period, and required the old contract to remain in place throughout the 
dispute.  The bill also allowed the state to shutdown any union which caused a strike for a 
maximum of three years.  Finally, Sundlun’s bill gave the governor the power to remove a 
member of a school committee from his seat if he was not fulfilling his obligations to the 
community.  Quinlan saw this bill as nothing more than a personal attack and responded that 
“giving Sundlun the power to remove elected local officials would be like declaring him Crown 
Emperor of Rhode Island.”268
With multitudes of unsuccessful proposals appearing before the General Assembly in the 
last few years, many in the press and politics attribute these legal failures to the power of the 
teachers’ unions.  As one reporter colorfully illustrated, “like seeing the ribs on a skinny kid, 
Rhode Island’s size allows us to see the blocs of votes, organized and to some degree controlled 
by local union leadership, that join together to create almost an unstoppable political 
machine.”269  Teachers’ unions are a pillar of the Democratic Party and in a state controlled by 
Democrats, teachers possess enormous power.  This powerful and united political bloc has 
proved extremely beneficial for the teachers of Rhode Island.  According to statistics collected 
by the National Education Association, for 2003-2004, Rhode Island teachers were the ninth 
highest paid educators in the country with a median salary of $52,261.270  Apparently Rhode 
Island’s “rite of September,” strong unions, and the willingness to challenge the law has allowed 
Rhode Island teachers to secure these advantageous working conditions.
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III.  The Bigger Picture:  The Future of Public Sector Labor Unions in Rhode Island
Rhode Island law for many years has struggled to achieve a balance between worker and 
employer rights.  However, in the last decade the Rhode Island Supreme Court, under the 
leadership of Chief Justice Frank Williams, has emerged with multiple rulings wearing away the 
power of the state’s public sector labor unions.  According to long-time Rhode Island union 
lawyer Richard Skolnik,
“Most recently and I would say for that 15 years, the decisions of the Supreme 
Court for setting forth the rules for arbitration, collective bargaining, and things of 
that nature- have not been, in my judgment, been fair and really don’t help the 
situation…if something isn’t balanced and favors one side, it impedes the process.
  Now for instance, our Supreme Court has gotten involved in arbitration decisions, to 
the extent that I don’t think another court in the country has gotten involved…I am 
talking about reversing decisions…Let an arbitrator make an award and unless the 
offer is off the wall he has done his job, leave him be.  Those recent decisions I believe 
favor management and therefore, are not conducive to a resolution of a balanced 
process.”271
Certain cases can be identified as particularly egregious to the rights of public sector 
labor in Rhode Island.  In 1991, the Supreme Court ruled that members of the Rhode Island 
Brotherhood of Correctional Officers could be forced to work involuntary overtime.  The union 
argued that this policy violated their collective bargaining agreement, but to no avail.272  Actions 
such as this, prompted the Brotherhood of Correctional Officers to conduct a study in 2002 of 
recent court arbitration decisions.  The union found that in twenty of twenty-three arbitration 
cases reviewed by the Supreme Court, rulings had been issued in favor of management.273  In 
1994, the Superior Court vacated an arbitration award favoring Rhode Island Council 94 of the 
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees and ruled that the state could 
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replace union workers in any state agency with convicted criminals on work release.274  Two 
years later, the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld this ruling.275  In 1997, this same union 
again suffered a setback when the Supreme Court upheld an appeal overturning another 
arbitration award.  In this case Rhode Island Council 94, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Woonsocket 
School Committee, the union local had a collective bargaining agreement which stated, “The 
School Department agrees that it will not subcontract work which can be satisfactorily and more 
economically performed by bargaining unit employees, provided it has the facilities for doing the 
work, and the available personnel.”276  However, when Woonsocket schools privatized their
lunch program, union workers were replaced by private employees.  Both the Superior and 
Supreme Courts supported this action.
While for many years, Rhode Island public sector labor unions have faced setbacks in the 
court, animosity from the press, and hostility from their communities nothing has deterred the 
state’s workers from becoming active union members.  This can be clearly illustrated with a few 
statistics.  In 1964, only 26 percent of private and public sector workers were unionized in Rhode 
Island, as compared to the national average of 29 percent.  This placed the state twenty-second in 
the national ranking of unionism.277
Rhode Island’s reputation as being a leader in the labor movement would soon return for 
between 1983 and 2003 the state’s percentage of unionized employees, both private and public 
sectors, soared far above the national average.  In 1983, only 18.8 percent of all workers in the 
United States were unionized which represented 15.3 percent of private sector employees and 
35.7 percent of public sector employees.  In Rhode Island, 22 percent of all labor was unionized 
274 Rhode Island Council 94, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. State of Rhode Island, 714 A.2d 584 (1998).
275 Rhode Island Council 94, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. State of Rhode Island, 1996 R.I. Super. LEXIS 108 (1996).
276
 Rhode Island Council 94, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Woonsocket School Committee, 703 A.2d 756, 757 (1997).
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 “Public Sector Unions and State Spending;” available from www.ripolicyanalysis.org/PubSectorUnions.html; Internet; 
accessed 19 April 2004.
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including 13.9 percent of private and 77 percent of public workers.  In 1993, only 17.7 percent of 
all laborers in the United States were affiliated with a union which represented 12.1 percent of 
private sector workforce and 43.8 percent of public sector workforce.  In Rhode Island, 18.8 
percent of all labor was unionized including 11.8 percent of private and 63.8 percent of public.  
Ten years later, in 2003, America’s total union membership had dropped to 14.3 percent 
including just 9.0 percent of private sector labor and 41.5 percent of public sector.  In Rhode 
Island, 17.0 percent of all labor was unionized including 9.0 percent of private and 65.1 percent 
of public.  The state’s unionized workforce has continually remained high above the national 
average even though there has been a nationwide decline in union membership.  In the last ten 
years, Rhode Island has managed to buck the national trend and actually seen an increase in the 
number of unionized public employees in the state.  This remarkable effort allowed the nation’s 
smallest state to have the second highest percentage of unionized public sector workers in the 
nation.  Only New York placed higher.278  These statistics prove that Rhode Island has remained 
a hospitable environment for labor despite the change in the court sentiment.  
Understanding why unionization, especially in the public sector, has remained a 
prominent factor in Rhode Island life, economics, and politics can be linked directly to the state’s 
long labor tradition.  In this small state there always was a “large contingent of organized 
workers in the construction, manufacturing, and building trades.  The climate here was always an 
organized state so when it came to the public employees turn, that the notion of unionization was 
not an anomaly.”279  If this trend should continue, unionization will never be an anomaly in 
Rhode Island.  Instead, the future for public sector workers in Rhode Island is very bright despite 
278
 Union Membership and Coverage Database; available from www.unionstats.com; Internet; accessed 29 April 2004.
279
 Casey, interview by author, 11 August 2004.
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the best efforts of the Rhode Island Supreme Court and the legislators to limit the rights and 
power of public sector unions.
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